
SELF-RELIANT DEFENSE

Without Bankruptcy or War

**Considerations for the Baltics, East Central Europe,
and members of the Commonwealth of Independent States**

by Gene Sharp

**with the assistance of
Bruce Jenkins**

The Albert Einstein Institution

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PREFACE

To state the obvious, the former constituent republics of the Soviet Union and the once Communist-ruled Eastern European states face numerous difficulties. The questions of how to maintain national independence, ensure survival in a dangerous world, and protect the continuing creation of new democratic and just systems are of primary concern.

The issue of providing effective national defense under difficult conditions needs to take into consideration: (1) the dangers of war and internal violence, (2) the risk of losing self-reliance by placing one's defense in the hands of foreign states, and (3) the high economic cost of military weaponry that would aggravate already serious economic problems.

This booklet addresses a defense policy which can potentially avoid those three dangers while greatly increasing the actual defense capacity of these countries. This policy is civilian-based defense. It is a policy which relies on the determination of the population and the strength of the society to make it impossible for foreign aggressors or internal putschists to rule.

Civilian-based defense applies prepared noncooperation and political defiance by trained populations. This would operate by preventing the attackers from ruling the attacked society, denying them their other objectives, subverting their troops and functionaries, and mobilizing international opposition to the attack. All this is done in ways which are most difficult for the attackers to counter.

This booklet relates this policy to the countries of the Baltics, East Central Europe, and the Commonwealth of Independent States,* all of

*"East Central Europe" is used here primarily to indicate the formerly Communist ruled countries of Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Romania, Bulgaria, Albania, and Yugoslavia (and its successor states such as Slovenia and Croatia). The analysis which refers to the members of the Commonwealth of Independent States is also relevant to Georgia and to nations now asserting claims of independence which were formerly part of the Soviet Union or its republics.

which must assess what their future defense policies will be, now that independence has come and the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact are gone.

This type of defense has its roots in several improvised defense struggles in Europe, as well as in much of the resistance and liberation struggles waged in Communist-ruled nations during the decades of totalitarian domination. However, in civilian-based defense this resistance is utilized in refined and strengthened forms.

Persons, groups, and governments that are interested in the discussion of civilian-based defense in this booklet are strongly encouraged to turn for further study to my more detailed book *Civilian-Based Defense* (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1990), and to the Lithuanian, Latvian, Estonian, Polish, and Russian editions which are now in preparation. Publication details of these and other translations can be obtained by writing to Gene Sharp, Albert Einstein Institution, 1430 Massachusetts Avenue, Cambridge, Massachusetts 02138, USA.

Gene Sharp
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1

CAN THERE BE ANOTHER TYPE OF DEFENSE?

The need for effective defense

Many events of the twentieth century have demonstrated that we live in a dangerous world. From these experiences several facts are clear. The international security situation can change rapidly. External dangers may arise unexpectedly and from unanticipated sources. Small nonprovocative nations and newly independent countries are sometimes victims of aggression. Not even large countries with developed military capacities are immune from foreign attack. In addition, internal attacks, as by coups d'état, occur widely. Political, military, or economic cliques at times attempt to impose dictatorships on their own people. However such dangers may temporarily recede or grow, external and internal threats will not disappear permanently.

The conclusion is inescapable: there is a need for defense. However, it is far from obvious how to provide effective defense, that is protection and preservation of a nation's society and independence in face of an attack.

At this time, the problems of reliability and effectiveness in defense are particularly acute for the formerly Communist states of East Central Europe, ranging from Poland to Bulgaria, and for the former constituent republics of the Soviet Union, from Lithuania to Uzbekistan.

These countries are now freed from their Communist governments (although not always from elite rule). Their independence has been recognized internationally. The Warsaw Pact and even the Soviet Union are gone. Yet, along with many other difficulties, these coun-

tries face, and will continue to face, defense problems. The international situation remains fluid. These nations may still at some point face a powerful expansionist neighbor, foreign military interference in certain border areas, or very likely internal attempts to impose new dictatorships. Serious internal social, economic, and political problems—including ethnic and national conflicts—could contribute to wider international or internal conflicts.

Yet, the traditional conception of defense—*military* defense—is bereft with problems, as we shall explore. All the countries of the Baltics, East Central Europe, and the former Soviet empire now have direct interests in maintaining their new independence without becoming highly dependent on a powerful ally or alliance. Therefore, if an alternative to militarization and dependence is at all possible, it may help these nations secure their independence and internal freedom without inviting potential disaster.

If military means are employed for defense or to deal with internal ethnic, national, political, or economic problems, the forces of centralization and dictatorship would very likely be strengthened. Fear of “civil war” could give those forces greater support. The plight of Croatia in late 1991—relying on military defense—should serve as a strong warning to others.

Ways not to meet defense needs

Recognition of the need for external and internal defense in no way ensures that effective means of defense are obvious or, if available, will be selected. Some defense efforts may even produce disaster.

Self-reliant military defense. The most common response to foreign aggression has been military resistance. However, military resistance is not necessarily the most suitable and effective defense policy. This is particularly true for the countries of the Baltics, East Central Europe, and the Commonwealth of Independent States.

The cost of modern military technology virtually precludes small and poor countries from acquiring military self-defense capacities sufficient to repel militarily powerful attackers. Modern military equipment and weapons—even tanks and airplanes—are now extremely expensive, and the costs are disproportionately high for these

countries. If they purchase these, serious economic problems are likely to be aggravated. If they receive these as gifts from a larger state, these countries risk falling under the donor's hegemony. Even for richer countries, the costs of "modernizing" professional military systems, are very high. That fact, combined with grave economic problems, argues strongly against quixotic attempts by these nations to acquire modern military weapons. Attempts to prepare strong self-reliant military defense can also contribute to economic disaster.

However, even if the problem of financial cost could be solved, the fact remains that military means do not necessarily produce defense. It is virtually impossible to protect one's society against the extraordinary destructive power and range of modern military weapons. Defense in the sense of protection and preservation is quite different from war.

When military weapons are actually used in war, grave problems arise:

- the defending population potentially experiences great destruction and casualties; and
- larger military powers will most likely defeat smaller ones, and that at a terrible cost.

Moreover, military build-ups have other grave disadvantages. The escalation of war-fighting capacities is likely to aggravate existing tensions between neighboring countries (especially where there is a history of grievances or contested borders). National minorities, possibly remembering past oppression, may fear that the enlarged military apparatus will be used against them. Increased military preparations may increase the likelihood that in international crises the military option actually will be used, instead of possible alternatives.

Dangers of depending on others. Given these problems of self-reliant military defense, small countries may abandon efforts to go it alone, and instead solicit the military assistance or guarantees of a major military power or alliance. Passing the problem and responsibility to others can be tempting. However, this is not a satisfactory solution.

When defense depends on foreign assistance, most judgements about whether to fight, when to do so, and for how long are in the hands of the assisting military "friend," not the attacked nation. In crises, militarily powerful allies may well prefer "order" to justice and

freedom, and are likely to place their own interests above the defense needs of the attacked nation. More rudely stated, militarily powerful “allies” may stand aside when their help is needed, may intervene only to help themselves, or may even betray the countries they are supposed to assist. Czechs and Slovaks can testify to this: abandoned by their allies in 1938, they were in turn invaded by their new allies thirty years later!

If foreign military assistance does come, one’s own country is likely to become the deadly battle ground. Such foreign assistance may be able to destroy but not really to defend. Furthermore, military involvement of another country or alliance risks expanding the conflict into a wider international war.

Guerrilla war as a defense option? In light of the problems of conventional forms of military defense some persons may suggest guerrilla war as an answer. Guerrilla warfare does not usually require the extremely expensive military outlays of conventional war, and guerrillas have sometimes defeated militarily stronger enemies. However, guerrilla warfare does not provide a realistic defense option for the countries of the Baltics, East Central Europe, and the former Soviet republics because it would subject them to immense casualties and destruction with little assurance of success. Guerrilla struggles—seen through political filters—are at times emotionally appealing, and are often romanticized. However, as defense policies, they suffer from many disadvantages.

In this type of warfare the casualty rates among the civilian population and guerrillas are almost always exceptionally high, much greater than in conventional warfare. This was illustrated by the partisan struggles against the Nazis in Yugoslavia.¹

Guerrilla struggles are also likely to reinforce the loyalty of the attackers’ troops when their own lives are at stake, at the very time when the resistance would benefit most from their demoralization and disintegration as a fighting force. Also, guerrilla struggle may take many years, may fail, and may result in vast social destruction. Even when successful, a guerrilla struggle may be followed by a new dictatorship ruling over an exhausted populace, as occurred in China, Algeria, and Vietnam. The vastly expanded military capacity produced by war can later provide the strong arm of repression in the hands of the political elite that commands those same military forces.

"Defensive defense" as an option. This policy, which has several variants, is often also called "nonoffensive defense" and "nonprovocative defense."² The basic conception is to configure military forces so that by their nature, mobility, and range they cannot be used for military aggression or to attack distant targets. Instead of rockets, for example, short-range fighter planes might be employed, and instead of tanks, anti-tank weapons would be used. This absence of effective military attack capacity would, it is argued, reduce anxieties and expectations of attack in neighboring countries that wish only to be able to defend themselves, and thereby reduce the risk of war.

The problems with a "defensive defense" policy become more obvious when an attack is actually launched. The risk of military escalation by either side with one's own or foreign weapons of greater destructiveness would remain. Even if escalation of weaponry does not occur, defensive war waged with this policy would almost guarantee immense civilian casualties among the defending population. In practice, the policy is essentially a combination of guerrilla warfare with high technology weaponry. The basic problems inherent in guerrilla warfare therefore are present here.

The internal defense problem: coups d'état

Foreign aggression is not the only defense problem these countries may face. There is also the internal defense problem of coups d'état (including executive usurpations) and declarations of martial law as means to establish dictatorships.

In a time of widespread economic, social, and political dislocation in the countries of the Baltics, East Central Europe, and the former Soviet Union, internal instabilities are manifest. Through attempted coups d'état or other means, former elites may seek to subvert or destroy democratic processes. Former Communist hard-liners calling for "law and order," or new political or military groups may seek to impose a dictatorial system. New forms of fascism may arise as well, with chauvinistic appeals to restore national "greatness." Intelligence agencies, foreign or domestic, may intervene.

A dangerous corollary to the development of a powerful military system, even if intended only to provide defense against external

attacks, is that it creates an internal danger. Powerful military systems may defy control by civil institutions, increasing the possibility of successful coups d'état.

Not all military establishments are inclined to carry out coups against legitimate governments. Officers may be genuinely committed to constitutional procedures. However, as the history of some countries in East Central Europe and the former Soviet Union illustrates, coups d'état can be a powerful threat to constitutional governments, and are a common way in which new dictatorships are imposed.

The specific forms and purposes of future coups d'état and other usurpations are not all knowable in advance, but the danger they pose is undeniable. Witness the August 1991 attempted "gang of eight" coup in the Soviet Union, described in Chapter Two. Traditional military means of defense provide no answer to these types of attack short of civil war, and that with little chance of success unless the putschists are very weak. Even the suspension of the very freedoms one is seeking to defend, in efforts to control dangerous cliques, is not a reliable means of prevention or defense against coups.

Internal usurpations and international aggression possess both common and distinct characteristics. They may appear to be fundamentally different, one usually an internal matter, the other is clearly foreign. However, they do bear some similarities. Each is a defense problem. Successful coups and successful invasions are both unconstitutional seizures of the state and society. Both lead to the imposition of illegitimate rule, and both may produce grave oppression of the society as a whole. Internal dangers as well as external ones therefore need to be kept in mind when planning defense policies.

A substitute system of defense is needed

In summary, defense against attack, and sufficient strength to make attack less likely, are still required by the Baltic countries, the nations of East Central Europe, and the members of the Commonwealth of Independent States. At the same time, for various of these countries self-reliant military defense has virtually no chance of being successful. Military assistance from major foreign states or alliances with massive military resources is both problematic and dangerous.

Recognition of problems with military defense policies should not lead to the conclusion that the answer lies in simple rejection of military means. A solution is not that easy. When faced with attack, if people and nations are offered no options except submission on the one hand and military resistance on the other, they will choose war almost every time. Calls for "peace" in face of aggression will not be heeded when they are seen as capitulation, passivity, and submission. Therefore, it is essential to examine critically alternative policies for providing effective deterrence and defense.

Could there be an alternative defense policy that does not suffer the flaws of military means? Could there be a defense policy that relies on a different approach entirely, but yet is rooted in historical experience and political reality? Such a policy would need to be one which:

- is effective in deterring and defending against attacks, both external and internal,
- is self-reliant,
- does not bankrupt the country,
- does not produce massive deaths and destruction, and
- does not place one's fate in the hands of powerful friends likely to serve their own interests first.

New ways of thinking

The problem of how to provide effective self-defense without producing either economic bankruptcy or military disaster has usually seemed to be without a solution. Perhaps our inability to find a solution derives from barriers in our thinking. Perhaps there is no fundamentally more adequate alternative unless we attempt to think outside of the military framework. As Commander Sir Stephen King-Hall (later Lord King-Hall) once stated, we need to "break through the thought barrier."³

To do this, we must first draw careful distinctions between the terms "defense" and "military" for they are not the same, and may indeed in many cases be incompatible with one another.

"Defense" is used here to mean the protection or preservation of a country's independence, its right to choose its own way of life, institutions, and standards of legitimacy, and to protect its own people's lives, freedom, and opportunities for future development.

“Defense” may also be defined as instrumentally effective action to defend—that is, action which preserves, wards off, protects, and minimizes harm in the face of hostile attack.

Military means have been long recognized as the predominant methods used to provide defense. However, in certain situations military means have been incapable of actually defending, as distinct from attacking, retaliating, killing, or destroying. Military capacity is only one set of means that may be intended to achieve the objective of defense. Modern military technology makes the relationship between military means and defense even more tenuous. Modern weapons are often too destructive actually to defend, and at times their very presence may encourage attack. The stationing of nuclear weapons, for example, may not only ensure that country will be targeted by other nuclear powers, but may even make it more vulnerable to a preemptive attack.

Civilian-based defense

There now exists a possible alternative defense policy which aims to provide deterrence and defense but by civilian means. It is called “civilian-based defense.”

Civilian-based defense is a policy intended to deter and defeat both foreign military invasions and occupations as well as internal take-overs, including executive usurpations and coups d’état. Civilian-based defense applies social, economic, political, and psychological “weapons” (or specific methods of action) to wage widespread noncooperation and political defiance.

A civilian-based defense struggle would seek the following aims:

- to make the attacked society, its population and institutions, unrulable by aggressors;
- to deny the attackers their objectives;
- to make impossible the consolidation of effective government (whether a foreign administration, a puppet regime, or a government of usurpers),
- to make the costs of attack and domination unacceptable; and,
- to, in some circumstances, destroy the attackers’ military and administrative forces by subverting the loyalty and

reliability of the attackers' troops and functionaries, especially in carrying out orders for repression, and even to induce them to mutiny.

Among the questions that we need now to consider seriously are these:

- Can nonviolent struggle—also called “people power”—be transformed into a powerful defense?
- Can such nonviolent struggle significantly contribute to the total defense capacity of a country or even replace military means for defense?
- Could that capacity, furthermore, be made strong enough so that it could deter, or at least contribute to deterring, external aggression and internal usurpation.

There is strong evidence that we can begin to answer these questions in the affirmative.

2

ANOTHER HISTORY

Prototypes of a new defense policy

One indication that a civilian-based defense policy may be possible is that it has important precedents in improvised defense struggles of the past. There exist prototypes of defense against both international aggression and coups d'état by the application of social, political, economic, and psychological power.

Of course, the power of nonviolent struggle has been demonstrated in cases beyond those primarily concerned with defense. In the search for effective means of self-reliant defense for the countries of the Baltics, East Central Europe, and the former Soviet empire, these non-defense cases of people power must also be considered. As most know, the history of this type of struggle for liberation and defense in East Central Europe is not new. Since the Second World War powerful nonviolent struggles have occurred in East Germany (1953 and 1989), in Hungary (1956–1957 and 1988–1989), in Poland (1956, 1970–1971, and 1980–1989), in Czechoslovakia (1968–1969 and 1989), and in the Baltic states (1987–1991).

In recent years, especially in late 1989, the peoples of these regions exhibited stunning power in dissolving well-entrenched dictatorships through largely nonviolent means. The democratic revolutions of 1989 and 1990 self-reliantly liberated several nations and millions of people. This was done with far fewer casualties and much less destruction than would have accompanied massive violent uprisings or invasions by foreign liberating armies. These revolutions are of much greater historical importance for the liberation and defense of peoples and nations throughout the world than the 1991 Gulf War.

These revolutions cannot be explained away, as some have at-

tempted, simply as the consequence of decades of United States or NATO military pressure, or by the fact that a more sensible Mr. Gorbachev occupied the Kremlin rather than a reincarnation of Mr. Brezhnev. Certainly many factors played roles in these revolutions. However, one of the major factors was people power: large segments of the population engaged in massive nonviolent struggle. In this technique of direct action, people and institutions protest symbolically, noncooperate in social, economic, and political ways, and intervene psychologically, politically, and physically in situations they oppose. Such methods can slow, paralyze, disrupt, or destroy an opponents' system, as occurred in these cases.

The history of European nonviolent struggle, of course, goes back much earlier than the Second World War. The Hungarian nonviolent resistance against Austrian rule, especially 1850–1867, and Finland's disobedience and political noncooperation against Russian rule, 1898–1905, are both examples of nonviolent struggle against long-established foreign occupations. The Russian Revolutions of 1905 and of February 1917 weakened and then destroyed the Tsarist system. Both were predominantly nonviolent. The 1940–1945 anti-Nazi resistance in Norway, Denmark, the Netherlands, and elsewhere, are among examples of struggles against fascism. These cases and earlier ones confirm that European peoples have long been capable of wielding nonviolent struggle. That makes its future planned use realistic.

Five cases of improvised nonviolent struggle for defense against internal and external attacks are especially relevant for our discussion. In these cases the resistance began quickly after the attack and had the explicit or tacit support of the government and often of major institutions of the society. Not all of the struggles succeeded, but much can be learned from them; they can provide important insights into the dynamics and problems of such conflicts. In all of these cases, however, there had been no planning, preparations, or training for this type of defense struggle. Three cases were against coups d'état, two others were against foreign invasions and occupations. Only rough sketches of each case are provided here.

*Germany 1920.*⁴ On 12 March 1920, unofficial Freikorps units of ex-soldiers and civilians occupied Berlin in a coup against the Weimar Republic organized by Dr. Wolfgang Kapp and Lieutenant-General Walter von Lüttwitz. The coup aimed to establish an authoritarian

regime of "experts." The small German army remained "neutral." The legal democratic government under President Friedrich Ebert fled. Though not well prepared, the coup might well have succeeded had there been no resistance.

The legal government proclaimed that all citizens should obey only it, and that the provinces should refuse all cooperation with the Kapp group. After a workers' strike against the coup broke out in Berlin, a proclamation calling for a general strike was issued under the names of President Ebert and Social Democratic ministers—though without their official approval.

The Kappists were quickly met with large-scale noncooperation by civil servants and conservative government bureaucrats, among others. Qualified persons refused to accept ministerial posts in the new regime. Kappist repression was harsh, and some strikers were shot to death. However, the strength of the noncooperation grew, and a general strike paralyzed Berlin. The Reichsbank refused funds and on 17 March the Berlin Security Police demanded Kapp's resignation. He fled to Sweden the same day, many of his aides left Berlin in civilian clothes, and Lüttwitz resigned. The Freikorps then marched out of Berlin, killing and wounding protesting civilians as they did so.

The coup was defeated by the combined action of workers, civil servants, bureaucrats, and the general population who had refused the popular and administrative cooperation that the usurpers required. The Weimar Republic survived to face other grave internal problems. The financial costs of the resistance to the attempted coup were modest, and an estimated several hundred persons had been killed and others wounded by the Kappists.

*France 1961.*⁵ French President Charles de Gaulle in early April indicated that he was abandoning the attempt to keep Algeria French. In response, on the night of 21–22 April rebelling French military units in Algeria seized control of the capital city of Algiers and nearby key points. However, the coup there could only succeed by replacing the legal government in Paris.

On 23 April the political parties and trade unions in France held mass meetings and called for a one-hour general strike. That night de Gaulle broadcast a speech, heard also in Algeria, urging people to defy and disobey the rebels, ordering the use of "all means" to bring them down. "I forbid every Frenchman, and in the first place every

soldier, to carry out any of their orders." Prime Minister Debré warned of an airborne attack from Algiers. However, instead of ordering military action, he called upon the general population to act: "As soon as the sirens sound, go there [to the airports] by foot or by car, to convince the mistaken soldiers of their huge error."

Copies of de Gaulle's speech were duplicated and widely distributed by the population and loyal French soldiers in Algeria. De Gaulle later declared: "From then on, the revolt met with a passive resistance on the spot which became hourly more explicit."

On 24 April ten million workers took part in the symbolic general strike. At airfields, people prepared vehicles to be placed on runways to block the landing of planes. A financial and shipping blockade was imposed on Algeria.

Loyal French troops in Algeria acted to undermine the rebels. Two-thirds of the transport planes and many fighter jets were flown out of Algeria, while other pilots blocked airfields or pretended mechanical failures. Army soldiers simply stayed in their barracks. There were many cases of deliberate inefficiency, with orders and files "lost" and communication and transportation delayed. Civil servants hid documents and withdrew.

On 25 April de Gaulle broadcast an order to loyal troops to fire at the rebels, but there was no need. The coup had already been fatally undermined. The rebel leaders resolved to call off the attempted coup, and during the night of 25–26 April the parachute regiment that had originally seized Algiers withdrew from the city.

There were a few casualties, probably three killed and several wounded in Algeria and Paris. The attack on the de Gaulle government had been defeated by defiance and dissolution.

*Germany 1923.*⁶ The German struggle in the Ruhr against the French and Belgian occupation was probably the first case of nonviolent resistance as official government policy against foreign aggressors. The invasion aimed to secure scheduled payments of heavy war reparations and to gain other political objectives, including separation of the Rhineland from Germany.

The German official policy of noncooperation had been decided upon only days before the invasion. There had been no preparations. Trade unions had strongly urged adoption of the policy. The German government was to finance the resistance. The means of resistance

included refusal to obey orders of the occupation forces, nonviolent acts of defiance, the refusal of coal mine owners to serve the invaders, massive demonstrations at courts during trials of resisters, refusal of workers to run the railroads for the French, the dismantling of equipment, publication of banned newspapers, posting of resistance proclamations and posters, and refusal to mine coal.

Resistance was complicated by various types of sabotage, including demolitions, which sometimes killed occupation personnel. This sabotage divided many supporters in the resistance, and demolitions reduced the international shift of sympathy toward Germany. Severe repression followed. Unemployment, inflation, and hunger were rampant. The unity of the resistance and to a large extent even the will to resist were finally broken.

On 26 September the German government called off the noncooperation campaign, but the sufferings of the population increased.

Many Belgians protested against their government's actions. Some French people advocated the German cause. Toward the end of 1923 Prime Minister Poincaré admitted to the French National Assembly that his policies had failed. Germany could not claim victory, but the French and Belgian invaders had achieved neither their economic nor their political objectives. The Rhineland was not detached from Germany. Britain and the United States intervened and secured a reduction of reparations payments, and occupation forces were withdrawn by June 1925.

*Czechoslovakia 1968–1969.*⁷ This case constitutes the most significant attempt thus far of using nonviolent resistance for national defense against foreign aggression. Ultimately, the result was defeat, but not quickly. For eight months the Czechs and Slovaks held off the complete subjection of their country.

On 21 August 1968 allied socialist military forces, led by the Soviet Union, invaded Czechoslovakia in order to enable pro-Moscow hard-line Communists to stage a coup d'état to replace the reform regime of Alexander Dubcek. Top Czechoslovak leaders were kidnapped by the KGB, and President Svoboda was held under house arrest.

As the invasion began, Czechoslovak troops were ordered to stay in their barracks while a very different type of resistance to the invasion was waged. Employees of the government news agency refused to issue a press release that Czechoslovak Communists had requested

the invasion. The President refused to sign a document from a group of Stalinist Communists.

Government officials, party leaders, and organizations denounced the invasion. The National Assembly demanded the release of arrested leaders and the immediate withdrawal of foreign troops. The clandestine defense radio (prepared for use in case of a NATO invasion) convened the Extraordinary Fourteenth Party Congress, called one-hour general strikes, asked rail workers to slow transport of Russian communications-tracking and jamming equipment, and discouraged collaboration. It was impossible to find sufficient collaborators to set up a puppet regime. People removed street signs and house numbers, and changed road direction signs to frustrate the invaders.

Unable to control the situation, Soviet officials brought President Svoboda to Moscow for negotiations, but he insisted, and achieved, the presence of other arrested Czechoslovak leaders. In Moscow, Czechoslovak leaders agreed to a compromise—probably a major strategic error—sacrificing some of the reforms while returning the reform leaders to their positions. For a week the general population refused to accept the compromise, seeing it as a defeat. The Soviet officials shifted from military action to a series of incremental political pressures.

The reform regime and many of the reforms were maintained, despite Soviet pressures, from August 1968 to April 1969. This was eight months, infinitely longer than the Czechoslovak military could possibly have held back a determined Soviet attack. During this period Czechoslovakia generally functioned normally despite the presence of Soviet troops, which were not used for repression. Then, in April anti-Soviet rioting provided the pretext for new Soviet demands. The Czechoslovak officials capitulated, ousting the Dubcek reform group and replacing it with the harder line Husak regime. Certain limited types of resistance continued. It is estimated that there were about fifty Czech and Slovak deaths and some hundreds wounded. The Husak regime continued persecution of dissidents and human rights activists until the demise of Communist rule in the face of a nonviolent uprising in late 1989—the “velvet revolution”—when once again the people acted as though Soviet troops were not occupying their country.

*The Soviet Union 1991.*⁸ On 18 August 1991 in an effort to block the radical decentralization of power in the Soviet Union, a group of hard-

line Soviet officials detained Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev and demanded that he turn over all executive powers to his vice-president. Gorbachev refused.

The self-declared "State Committee for the State of Emergency"—composed of, among others, the Soviet vice-president, prime minister, defense minister, chairman of the KGB, and interior minister—declared a six-month "state of emergency." Opposition newspapers were banned, political parties suspended (except the Communist Party), and demonstrations forbidden. The junta's first decree asserted the primacy of the Soviet constitution over those of the republics and mandated adherence to all orders of the Emergency Committee.

It appeared that the junta had the entire military forces of the Soviet Union at their disposal. Armored divisions and paratroops were deployed throughout Moscow. In the Baltics, pro-coup forces seized telephone, radio, and television facilities and blockaded key ports. Armored assault units outside Leningrad began to move on the city.

In Moscow, tens of thousands of people gathered spontaneously in the streets to denounce the coup. In a dramatic show of defiance, Russian Federation President Boris Yeltsin climbed upon a hostile tank and denounced the putschists action as a "rightist, reactionary, anti-constitutional coup." Yeltsin proclaimed "all decisions and instructions of this committee to be unlawful" and appealed to citizens to rebuff the putschists and for servicemen not to take part in the coup. Yeltsin concluded with an appeal for a "universal unlimited strike." Later that day Yeltsin ordered army and KGB personnel within the Russian republic to obey him, not the putschists.

Thousands gathered in front of the Russian "White House" (parliament building) to protect it from attack. Barricades were erected; trolley buses and automobiles blocked the streets. Although the call for a general strike went largely unheeded, miners in the Kuzbass coal fields and near Sverdlosk did strike.

The putschists decreed a special state of emergency in Moscow because of "rallies, street marches, demonstrations and instances of instigation to riots." On the second night of the coup, resistance organizers pasted leaflets throughout the city's subway system calling for a mass demonstration in front of the "White House" the following day.

In Leningrad, 200,000 people rallied in response to Mayor Anatoly Sobchak's call for "the broadest constitutional resistance" to the coup. Tens of thousands in Moldavia blocked the streets to keep Soviet troops at bay. Leaders of the Ukraine and Kazakhstan denounced the coup. A large rally in Minsk called for mass civil disobedience. Lithuanian President Landsbergis appealed to citizens to surround the parliament building in Vilnius to protect it from attack. Emergency sessions of the parliaments of Latvia and Estonia declared full independence from the Soviet Union.

In Moscow, banned opposition newspapers secretly printed "The Common Paper" which called on citizens to resist. A donated radio transmitter allowed the Russian government to broadcast resistance information across the nation through local relay stations. The banned independent radio station "Echo Moscow" continued to broadcast, carrying live speeches from an emergency session of the Russian parliament. Although banned, Russian Television technicians put their news programs on videotape and distributed them to twenty cities around the Soviet Union.

Officials in the state-controlled media refused cooperation with the putschists. The defiant speeches of Yeltsin and Sobchak were aired on the nightly news program which the Emergency Committee's KGB censor choose not to block. Afterwards, the First Deputy Chairman of Soviet Television, Valentin Lazutkin, received a call from Interior Minister Pugo: "You have disobeyed two orders . . . You have given instructions to the people on where to go and what to do. You will answer for this." Defiant crowds swelled in front of the White House that night to protect the Russian government.

Concerted efforts were made to undermine the loyalty of the putschists' forces. Leaflets and food were distributed to soldiers. Citizens pleaded with tank crews to switch sides. Yeltsin urged discipline: "Don't provoke the military. The military has become a weapon in the hands of the putschists. Therefore we should also support the military and maintain order and discipline in contact with them."

In several cases, entire military units deserted the putschists. Ten tanks in front of the White House turned their turrets away from the parliament building, pledging to help defend it against attack. Mutinies against the putschists were reported at the Leningrad Naval Base and at a paratrooper training academy. Units in the Far East refused to support the junta. In the Russian republic, local interior ministry

police and KGB units declared loyalty to Yeltsin. Defense Minister Yasov ordered the Tula division to withdraw from its positions near the White House because of the troops' uncertain loyalty. Interior Minister Pugo disbanded the Moscow police out of fear of disloyalty to the putschists.

In the afternoon of the second day of the coup, the putschists attempted to put together a new assault team to attack the Russian White House. Army paratroops and Interior ministry forces were to surround the White House, clearing the way for an attack by the elite KGB Alpha Group. The head of the Army's paratroops and the commander of the Soviet Air Force, however, refused to take part in the attack. Hours before the planned attack, the commander of the KGB Alpha Group stated that his forces would not take part. "There will be no attack. I won't go against the people."

The following morning, the Defense Board of the Soviet Union voted to withdraw the troops from Moscow. Members of the Emergency Committee were subsequently arrested (one committed suicide). President Gorbachev returned to power. Casualties were low—a total of five people were killed during the coup attempt.

The coup had been defeated. Mass public defiance and disobedience in the military thwarted the hard-liners attempt to return to authoritarian rule.

Advancing from the past

These cases of civilian resistance for national defense are not examples of civilian-based defense, for they were all improvised and lacked the advantages of planning, preparations, and training—elements that are regarded as essential by theorists of this policy.

To draw a parallel, imagine completely unprepared military action—lacking strategists, planning, organized fighting forces, a command structure, weaponry and ammunition, contingency planning, communications, and transportation. Such improvised military action is not likely to be effective, if it is even possible. However, these are the circumstances in which civilian resistance for defense has normally operated in the past. It is now possible to give the advantages of preparations, which military struggle has had for centuries, to the forces of people power for defense.

3

DIRECT DEFENSE OF THE SOCIETY

Civilian-based defense

The term “civilian-based defense” indicates defense by civilians (as distinguished from military personnel) using civilian means of struggle (as distinct from military or paramilitary means). As indicated earlier, the objectives of civilian-based defense are to deter and defeat both internal usurpations and international aggression. This is done by developing a prepared capacity of the civilian population to wage noncooperation and defiance against potential attackers, using social, economic, political, and psychological “weapons” (or specific methods of action). Weapons of violence are not required, and would in fact be counterproductive.

Employing these weapons, civilian defenders would aim to:

- make the attacked society unrulable by internal or foreign aggressors;
- maintain control and self-direction by the defenders of their own society;
- resist effectively the imposition of an unwanted government over the population;
- make the institutions of the society into omnipresent resistance organizations;
- deny the attackers’ their objectives;
- make the costs of the attack and attempted domination unacceptable to the attackers;
- subvert the reliability and loyalty of the attackers’ troops and functionaries and induce them to mutiny;

- report the attack, resistance, and repression to the population of the attackers' homeland or their usual supporters;
- encourage dissension and opposition among the attackers' home population and usual supporters;
- stimulate international opposition to the attack by diplomatic, economic, and public opinion pressures against the attackers; and
- achieve international support for the defenders in communications, finances, food, diplomacy, and other resources.

An effective societal defense is possible because neither a coup nor an invasion immediately gives the attackers their specific objectives and control of the population, society, and governmental structure. Even in the absence of resistance, those objectives and control take time and effort to achieve. In the face of well-prepared noncooperation and defiance, the achievement of those ends may not only be slowed, but may be blocked by a skilled and determined civilian population.

Deterrence

As with military security policies, civilian-based defense works best when it helps to prevent an attack. Therefore, a key aim of this policy is to help dissuade and deter any possible attacker. The deterrence capacity of civilian-based defense has two key elements: the actual ability of the society to defend itself, and the potential attackers' perception of that ability. Potential aggressors may conclude that if the objectives of the attack are likely to be thwarted, bringing unacceptable costs to them, then it might be best to cancel the whole plan. Therefore, understanding the deterrence capacity of civilian-based defense depends on understanding the actual defense strategies and capacities of this policy.

Any deterrence policy, whether military-based or civilian-based, can fail, for any number of reasons. In contrast to nuclear deterrence, however, if civilian-based deterrence fails, the policy of civilian-based defense still provides a viable defense option to combat the attack without the risk of massive destruction and immense casualties.

Herewith we find a major distinction in the way deterrence is produced through nuclear weapons from how it could be produced by civilian-based defense. Civilian-based deterrence would not be

produced by the threat of massive physical destruction and death on the attackers' homeland, as nuclear and high tech conventional military weaponry does. Instead, this deterrence would be produced by the actual capacity to defend successfully.

How is this type of deterrence possible? Invasion is, of course, not an objective in and of itself. It is a way to achieve a wider purpose, which almost always involves occupation of the invaded country. Similarly, in a coup d'état, the seizure of buildings, transportation and communication centers, and key geographical points is not done for its own sake, but rather to control the state apparatus and thereby the country. By securing such broad control of the country, the aggressors hope to achieve the specific objectives of the attack.

Whether the aim of the attack is political domination, economic exploitation, ideological indoctrination, or some other, achievement of the aim will most likely require the cooperation of at least part of the inhabitants of the attacked country. If it is clear that such cooperation will be firmly denied, the attackers may reconsider whether their objectives can actually be obtained.

If a successful invasion is clearly to be followed by immense difficulties in occupying and controlling the country, its society, and population, then the invasion's apparent "success" in the easy entry of its military forces will be revealed as a dangerously misleading mirage. Certainly the Russians invading Czechoslovakia in August 1968 encountered in the early stages great and unanticipated difficulties caused by various types of nonviolent noncooperation and defiance. Preparations and training for civilian-based defense could have increased these difficulties considerably. Where preparations and training are thorough, a would-be invader might perceive that it will not be possible to rule successfully the country that might be so easily invaded. Civilian-based defense has at that moment been revealed as a powerful deterrent.

There are other contingencies that potential attackers would need to consider. A population's spirit and methods of resistance could well spread to other populations that the attackers would prefer to remain passive, such as their home populace generally or aggrieved minorities and oppressed groups.

For these various reasons, civilian-based defense has to be considered as a possible non-nuclear deterrent to both conventional attack and coups d'état.

Fighting with civilian weapons

The development of wise defense strategies (to be discussed in the next chapter) will be significantly influenced by full awareness of the range of methods of resistance, or "weapons," which are available for the defense struggle.

One hundred ninety-eight specific methods of nonviolent action have been identified, and there are certainly scores more. These methods are classified under three broad categories: protest and persuasion, noncooperation, and intervention. Methods of nonviolent protest and persuasion are largely symbolic demonstrations, including parades, marches, and vigils (54 methods). Noncooperation is divided into three sub-categories: (a) social noncooperation (16 methods), (b) economic noncooperation, including boycotts (26 methods) and strikes (23 methods), and (c) acts of political noncooperation (38 methods). Nonviolent intervention, by psychological, physical, social, economic, or political means, includes the fast, nonviolent occupation, and parallel government (41 methods).

The use of a considerable number of these methods—carefully chosen, applied persistently and on a large scale, wielded in the context of a wise strategy and appropriate tactics, by trained civilians—is likely to cause any illegitimate regime severe problems.

Some methods require people to perform acts unrelated to their normal lives, such as distributing leaflets, operating an underground press, going on hunger strike, or sitting down in the streets. These methods may be difficult for some people to undertake except in very extreme situations.

Other methods of nonviolent struggle instead require people to continue approximately their normal lives, though in somewhat different ways. For example, people may report for work, instead of striking, but then deliberately work more slowly or inefficiently than usual. "Mistakes" may be consciously made more frequently. One may become "sick" and "unable" to work at certain times. Or, one may simply refuse to work. One might go to church when the act expresses not only religious but also political convictions. One may act to protect children from the attackers' propaganda. One might refuse to join certain "recommended" or required organizations that one would not have joined freely in earlier times. The similarity of such types of action to people's usual activities and the limited degree of

departure from their normal lives may make participation in the national defense struggle much easier for many people.

In contrast to military means, the methods of nonviolent struggle can be focused directly on the issues at stake. For example, if the issues are primarily political, then political forms of nonviolent struggle would be crucial. These would include denial of legitimacy to the attackers, noncooperation with the attackers' regime, a puppet government, or the putschists. Noncooperation would also be applied against specific policies. At times stalling and procrastination or open disobedience may be practiced.

On the other hand, if the crux of the conflict is primarily economic, then economic action, such as boycotts or strikes, may be appropriate. An attempt by the attackers to exploit the economic system might be met with limited general strikes, slow-downs, refusal of assistance by, or disappearance of, indispensable experts, and the selective use of various types of strikes at key points in industries, in transportation systems, and in the supply of raw materials.

Nonviolent struggle produces change in four ways. When members of the opponent group are emotionally moved by the courageous nonviolent resisters suffering repression or rationally influenced by the justness of their cause, they may come around to a new viewpoint which positively accepts the resisters' aims. This mechanism is called conversion. Though cases of conversion in nonviolent action do sometimes happen, they are rare, and in most conflicts this does not occur at all or at least not on a significant scale.

Far more often, nonviolent struggle operates by changing the conflict situation and the society so that the opponents simply cannot do as they like. It is this change which produces the other three mechanisms: accommodation, nonviolent coercion, and disintegration. Which of these occurs depends on the degree to which the conflict situation and the society are changed during the struggle.

If the issues are not fundamental ones and the contest of forces has altered the power relationships to approximately an even basis, the immediate conflict may be ended by reaching an agreement, a splitting of differences or compromise. This mechanism is called accommodation. Many strikes are settled in this manner, for example, with both sides attaining some of their objectives but neither achieving all it wanted.

However, nonviolent struggle can be much more powerful than

indicated by the mechanisms of conversion or accommodation. Mass noncooperation and defiance can so change social and political situations, especially power relationships, that the opponents' ability to control the situation is in fact taken away despite their continued efforts to secure their original objectives. For example, the opponents may be unable to control or crush the widespread disruption of normal economic, social, or political processes. The opponents' military forces may have become so unreliable that they no longer simply obey orders to repress resisters. Although the opponents' leaders remain in their positions, and adhere to their original goals, their ability to act effectively has been taken away from them. That is called nonviolent coercion.

In some extreme situations, the conditions producing nonviolent coercion are carried still further. The opponents' leadership in fact loses all ability to act and their own structure of power collapses. The resisters' self-direction, noncooperation, and defiance become so complete that the opponents now lack even a semblance of control over them. The opponents' bureaucracy refuses to obey its own leadership and their orders. The opponents' troops and police mutiny. The opponents' usual supporters or population repudiate their former leadership, denying that they have any right to rule at all. Hence, their former assistance and obedience falls away. The fourth mechanism of change, disintegration of the opponents' system, is so complete that they do not even have sufficient power to surrender.

In planning defense strategies, these four mechanisms should be kept in mind. The selection of one or more preferred mechanism of change in a conflict will depend on numerous factors, including the absolute and relative power of the contending groups. It should be remembered that at any given time in a conflict the existing power capacities of the contenders are only temporary. Due to the forces applied in the struggle and their consequences, the power of each side can change rapidly, rising or falling in response to what is done in the course of the conflict.

Defending the society itself, not borders

One of the ways in which civilian-based defense differs from conventional military defense is that it focuses on defense of the society by the society itself, on social and political space, not defense of points of

geography, terrain, or physical space.

Military forms of defense are often assumed to be able to hold back attackers at the frontier. However, for most of the twentieth century military means have been in fact incapable of effective frontier defense. The introduction of the airplane, tank, jet, and rocket, has in most cases abolished the possibility of effective geographical defense—that is protection of the territory and everyone and everything within it by exclusion of attacking forces and weapons. Indeed, battles over territory often result in massive deaths and physical destruction of the society being “defended.”

Instead of attempting to provide defense by fighting over geographical points, people applying civilian-based defense actively defend their way of life, society, and freedoms directly. The priorities of action are crucial. The maintenance of a free press, for example, or keeping the attackers’ propaganda out of the schools, is of more direct importance to democracy and independence than, say, possession of a given mountain or building, or the killing of young conscripts in the invaders’ army.

This type of direct defense of the society has been powerfully demonstrated in struggles in Poland. Despite brutal repression and massive killings during the Nazi-occupation (1939–1945), for example, the Polish people managed to keep in operation a whole underground school system.⁹ During the period of martial law in the 1980s, the Poles, led by the trade union Solidarity, had great success in keeping their non-state institutions independent and operating. This situation has been described as the Communist military dictatorship bobbing around on the surface of the society, able to thrust damaging blows on occasion down into it, but never able to change or control the society fundamentally. It was this powerful capacity of the Polish society to maintain defiant self-direction that ultimately doomed the Communist dictatorship.

Although civilian-based defense cannot defend geographic borders, some limited stalling actions could be taken at the initial stage of an attack. For example, the deployment of troops could be delayed by obstructionist activities at the docks (if the troops came by sea), by refusal to operate the railroads, or by blocking highways and airports with thousands of abandoned automobiles. These and other steps, however, would be only a symbolic prelude to the substantive resistance.

The role of social institutions

In order to establish political control, at some point an occupation regime or new illegitimate "government" will most likely attack the society's independent institutions. In this situation the defense of these institutions becomes a major fighting front. Independent social, economic, and political institutions provide the core structures upon which a civilian-based defense policy would rely. Often, these attacks will be made in order to destroy the resistance capacity of the society. At other times, such attacks may be part of a totalitarian scheme, seeking to atomize and then remake the society in the totalitarian image.

If the attackers do gain control of the courts, schools, unions, cultural groups, professional societies, religious institutions, and the like, the future capacity for resistance will be weakened for a long period. Therefore, civilian-based defense must firmly resist any efforts of the invader to control the society's institutions.

How could these institutions defend themselves and the society from the attackers? A few examples will show how this could be done.

The courts, declaring the attackers' an illegal and unconstitutional body, would continue to operate on the basis of pre-invasion laws and constitutions, and they would refuse to give moral support to the invader, even if they had to close the courts. Order would then be maintained by social pressures, solidarity, and nonviolent sanctions. Underground courts have been used in some situations, especially against collaborators. In Poland, for example, during the German occupation the underground government's Directorate of Civilian Resistance used the "sentence of infamy" requiring social boycott of the declared collaborator as an alternative to a death sentence.¹⁰

Attempts to control the school curriculum would be met with the teachers' and administrators' refusal to introduce the attackers' propaganda. Teachers would explain to the pupils the issues at stake. Regular education would continue as long as possible, and then if necessary the school buildings would be closed and private classes held in the children's homes. These forms of resistance occurred in Norway during the Nazi occupation.¹¹

Trade unions and professional groups could resist the attackers' domination by abiding by their pre-invasion constitutions and procedures, denying recognition to new organizations set up by or for the

invader, refusing to pay dues or attend meetings of any new pro-invader organization, and by carrying out disruptive strikes, boycotts, and forms of political noncooperation. Organizations and associations could continue their activities underground when faced with takeover attempts by the attackers, as did many Norwegian groups when fascist officials attempted to establish control over voluntary and professional organizations.¹²

These examples illustrate how organizations and institutions could deny legitimacy to and refuse cooperation with attackers. The cumulative impact of such structural noncooperation is to prevent the attackers from controlling the society. That prevention makes future resistance more possible and effective. It helps to block the attackers from achieving their specific objectives, and contributes to the collapse of the whole venture.

Neutralizing the attackers' troops

Initial obstructionist activities and acts of nonviolent resistance against the deployment of troops would make clear to the individual attacking soldiers that, whatever they might have been told, they were not welcome as an invasion force or as enforcers of the putsch, as the case may be. In order to communicate determination to resist, the people also could wear mourning bands, stay at home, stage a limited general strike, or defy curfews. The invader's parades of troops through the cities could be met by conspicuously empty streets and shuttered windows, and any public receptions would be boycotted. Such actions would give notice to friend and foe that the occupation will be firmly resisted, and at the same time the people's morale will be built up so as to prevent submission and collaboration.

The specific tactics used by resisters to influence the troops would need to be decided by the resistance leadership. Each country and situation would have its own conditions and circumstances. In almost every case, however, efforts would be made to undermine the loyalty of individual soldiers and functionaries. The populace could urge the invading soldiers not to believe their leaders' propaganda. The soldiers and functionaries would be informed that there will be resistance, but that the resistance will be of a special type, directed against the attempt to seize control but without threatening harm to them as

individuals. If this could be communicated, they might be more likely to help the resisting population in small ways, to avoid brutalities, and to mutiny at a crisis point, than they would if they expected at any moment to be killed by snipers or bombs.

In some situations, the troops would be treated with "fraternization without collaboration," a tactic of friendly personal gestures combined with noncooperative political resistance, which could be aimed to persuade individual soldiers and others of the wrongs of the attack. In other situations, soldiers would be socially isolated, treated with the "cold shoulder." This tactic, commonly practiced by the Danes against German occupation soldiers during the Second World War, is sometimes seen as necessary in order to contribute to the soldiers' demoralization and disintegration as a reliable force for repression.¹³

There is often a temptation to regard occupation soldiers, or troops of the putschists, as being themselves the enemy. Consequently, resisters have at times shown hatred to them, harassed them, caused them to feel isolated and abandoned, and have even physically beaten or killed them. This behavior, however, can be highly counterproductive and dangerous to the possible success of the resistance. Under those conditions, soldiers will be much more likely to obey orders to commit brutalities and killings against the resisting population.

Instead, some strategists are convinced, more positive results for the defense will occur if these soldiers are regarded as fellow victims of the aggressors' system. Repeated demonstrations that there is no violent intent or threat toward them, accompanied by a clear determination not to submit to the attacking regime, is likely to be most effective. It is believed that this combination of strong resistance without personal hostility will have a chance to create morale problems, at least among some of the soldiers. In Czechoslovakia immediately after the 21 August 1968 invasion, for example, invasion troops had to be rotated out of the country due to morale problems.¹⁴ Uncertain loyalty to the attackers' leadership, problems of maintaining self-respect while inflicting repression, inefficiency in carrying out orders, and finally disaffection and even mutiny—all can be exacerbated through the defenders' resistance without physical attacks on soldiers and functionaries.

The opponents' troops may, of course, despite such a non-threatening stance, still perpetrate brutalities. The killing of nonviolent demonstrators attempting to block seizure of the television tower in

Vilnius, Lithuania, on 13 January 1991, demonstrates this danger.

Nevertheless, it is significant that a Russian military correspondent (who later left the army) interviewed on Vilnius radio just after the tragic events at the television tower said approximately: "The Soviet military are at a loss how to deal with these nonresisting people: this nonviolent struggle is like a bone in their throat."¹⁵ He added that many soldiers and noncommissioned officers in the Vilnius garrison felt dejected and completely lost after the massacre, and that in the city of Kaunas, garrison soldiers said they would never shoot civilians.

The above incident is an isolated case, but it does at least demonstrate the potential of nonviolent resistance to contribute to the undermining of the reliability of the attackers' troops. It points to the potential of taking the attackers' army away from them through this unique type of struggle.

Weaknesses of dictatorships

In facing dictatorships, especially extreme ones, effective resistance sometimes seems impossible. It is rarely recognized that all dictatorial systems contain critical weaknesses in the form of inefficiencies, internal conflicts, and other factors contributing to impermanence.¹⁶ It is precisely these features that offer themselves up for exploitation by civilian-based defense strategists.

Seventeen specific weaknesses of extreme dictatorships have been identified, including the following:¹⁷

- The cooperation of a multitude of people and groups which is needed to operate the system may be restricted or withdrawn.
- The system may become routine in its operation, therefore more moderate and less able to shift its activities drastically at the service of doctrinal imperatives and sudden policy changes.
- The central command may receive from the lower echelons inaccurate or incomplete information on which to make decisions because of the subordinates' fear of punishments for accurate reporting, thereby inducing displeasure from higher echelons.

- Ideology may erode, and the myths and symbols of the system may become unstable.
- Firm adherence to the ideology may lead to decisions injurious to the system because insufficient attention is given to actual conditions and needs.
- The system may become inefficient and ineffective due to deteriorating competency and effectiveness of the bureaucracy, or due to excessive controls and red tape.
- The system's internal personal, institutional, and policy conflicts may detrimentally affect and even disrupt its operation.
- Intellectuals and students may become restless in response to conditions, restrictions, doctrinalism, and repression.
- The general public, instead of supporting the dictatorship, may over time become apathetic or skeptical.
- When a dictatorship is new, time is required for it to become firmly established, allowing an especially vulnerable period when it is highly vulnerable to disruption and dysfunction.
- The extreme concentration of decision-making and command means that too many decisions will be made by too few people, thus increasing the chances of errors.
- If the regime, in order to avoid some of these problems, decides to diffuse decision-making and administration, this will lead to further erosion of central controls, and often to the creation of dispersed new power centers.

While such weaknesses guarantee nothing, they do illustrate that vulnerable aspects of dictatorial rule exist. These vulnerable points can be identified and appropriate forms of resistance can be concentrated at them. Such action is compatible with the nature of civilian-based defense.

The basic reason why civilian-based defense can be effective against brutal dictatorships is that even such extreme political systems cannot free themselves entirely from dependence on their subjects. As an articulated strategy, civilian-based defense is designed to deny dictatorial rulers the compliance, cooperation, and submission they require.

Nonviolent resistance has occurred against totalitarian and other dictatorial systems, on an improvised basis without training, preparations, and know-how. Totalitarians like Hitler deliberately sought to

discourage potential resistance by promoting an exaggerated impression of their regime's omnipotence, both domestically and internationally.

Preparations for civilian-based defense

The decision to adopt, prepare, and eventually wage this type of defense requires the support of the defending population, for in civilian-based defense the whole society becomes a nonviolent fighting force. Active support and participation of vast segments of the population, as well as of the society's major institutions, is essential. The citizens must have both the will and the ability to defend their societies against threats to their freedom and independence.

The need for a willingness to defend does not imply that the population must believe their system and society to be perfect. It does mean, however, that they see their system to be preferable to any regime likely to be imposed by putschists or by foreign invaders. The population may recognize that their social system may still have problems, but believe that any desired changes should be made by their own democratic decision, not by attackers.

Peacetime improvements in the social, political, and economic conditions of society are likely both to reduce grounds for collaboration by aggrieved groups and to increase commitment to defense by the general populace in the event of a crisis. In turn, measures to increase the effectiveness of civilian-based defense by social improvements and greater participation in social institutions and defense are likely to enhance the vitality of democratic society. With this policy there is no necessary contradiction between defense requirements and domestic social needs.

Defense by nonviolent noncooperation and defiance has at times been improvised, as the prototypical examples from Germany, France, Czechoslovakia, and the Soviet Union show, with some highly positive results. However, in defense crises, high motivation and spontaneity are insufficient to ensure victory. It is now possible to move beyond spontaneity to increase the effectiveness of noncooperation and defiance in defense.

This is not to say that there is no role for spontaneity in this policy. Good motives and creative spontaneity can be helpful, but need to be

relied upon with restraint because they can have negative results. Spontaneity can lead people to disrupt the application of a sound strategy; distract attention to less significant issues and activities; create situations in which harsh repression produces unnecessary casualties; and facilitate counterproductive violence by the resisters. "Productive" spontaneity needs to be self-disciplined and rooted in a thorough understanding of the requirements of the nonviolent technique and of the chosen civilian-based defense strategies.

Civilian-based defense is most likely to be effective if it is waged by the population and its institutions on the basis of advance preparation, planning, and training, derived from research into nonviolent struggle, the attackers' system, and its weaknesses. The policy will be stronger in proportion to the extent and quality of the preparations for waging it.

A major educational program for the whole country on the nature and purpose of civilian-based defense would therefore be required. People would be encouraged to study this policy individually and in groups, and to discuss it in their families, neighborhoods, and organizations. Governmental bodies at various levels and independent institutions—such as schools, churches, trade unions, business groups, newspapers, television stations, and the like—could undertake this educational effort. People would be informed, and inform themselves, about the broad outlines of the policy, the ways it would operate, the requirements for its effectiveness, and the results expected. This would help people decide if they wanted to adopt such a policy and, if so, would help them to prepare for it.

Certain occupational groups would need particular types of training. Communications and transportation workers, religious leaders, police, military officers and troops (if the army remained), educators, printers, factory managers, workers, and more—all would require specific action guidelines about how their particular activities and responsibilities could be turned toward effective forms of nonviolent resistance.

In addition to the general population and certain professional groups, there may be a role for specialists in civilian-based defense. Training of civilian-based defense specialists would vary in its character and purpose, ranging from imparting the skills that are required by local neighborhood defense workers to developing the incisive strategic acumen needed to help plan broad campaigns. The latter might

require advanced specialized study.

Specialists in civilian-based defense might play an important role in initiating resistance in crises. In some situations these specialists could serve as special cadres for carrying out particularly dangerous tasks. Other specialists might be kept in reserve to guide later stages of the resistance. However, the main thrust of civilian-based defense must be assumed by the general population. Since the defense leaders generally would be among the first people imprisoned or otherwise incapacitated by the attackers, the population must be able to continue the defense struggle on its own initiative.

Preparations for civilian-based defense would not consist simply of instructions issued by a centralized leadership to be implemented at the lower levels. Development of an effective strategy would require an analysis of the resistance potential of many sectors, such as the transportation system and personnel, government departments, schools, communication media, and so forth. The objective would be to identify the specific points at which noncooperation might have a maximum impact against any attempt by attackers to seize control of the society and to gain specific objectives. People working in such places would often be the best sources of the information needed to make those decisions about resistance. To make accurate tactical judgements, however, one would also need to know the forms of nonviolent action, strategic principles of nonviolent resistance, the attackers' weaknesses, the kinds of repression to expect, the crucial political issues on which to resist, and other practical points.

The organization of an underground system of contacts would probably have to wait until a crisis, in order to make it harder for the opponents to know the exact personnel and structure of the resistance. However, in peacetime "war games" could offer civilian-based defense specialists an advance opportunity to examine the viability of alternative defense strategies and tactics. Also, training maneuvers could be conducted in which imaginary occupations or coups would be met by civilian resistance. These could be acted out at levels ranging from local residential areas, offices, or factories, to cities, states, regions, and even the whole country.

Technical preparations would also be necessary for civilian-based defense. Provisions and equipment would be required for effective communications after the attackers had seized newspaper facilities, radio stations, and other mass media. Equipment to publish under-

ground newspapers and resistance leaflets and to make broadcasts could be hidden beforehand. It should be possible to make advance arrangements for locating such broadcasting stations or printing plants in the territory of a friendly neighboring country as part of a civilian-based defense mutual aid agreement.

Since attackers might attempt to force the population into submission by deliberate measures to produce starvation, and since certain resistance methods (e.g., a general strike) could disrupt regular modes of distribution, emergency supplies of food staples could be decentralized and stored locally. Alternative means of providing fuel and water during emergencies should also be explored. For certain types of crises in countries with significant housing and food supplies in rural or forest areas, plans might be considered for the dispersal of large groups of people from big cities to those areas where the oppressor would find it more difficult to exercise control over them.

Each country and each defense scenario entails its own set of specific problems and considerations. Defense officials, civilian-based resistance specialists, and various sections of the general population would need to identify the specific types of preparations and training most relevant for their particular conditions, and then to formulate plans to meet those needs.

With conscious efforts to refine and prepare civilian struggle, it should be possible to multiply the combat strength of nonviolent struggle for civilian-based defense purposes several times over the power demonstrated in the most successful improvised past nonviolent struggles, such as those in Poland 1980–1989, East Germany 1989, and Czechoslovakia 1989–1990. That expanded power capacity could be a powerful deterrent and defense.

4

FIGHTING STRATEGIES

The society wages defense

Strategies of civilian-based defense might be grouped initially into two broad categories, "general resistance" and "organized resistance."¹⁸ Let us explore these two types of strategies.

Well in advance of an attack, a number of key points at which resistance would be essential are to be selected and identified to the general population. These would be points at which people and institutions should resist even in the absence of any specific instructions from the defense leadership. This type of resistance is called "general resistance." These points might include, for example, efforts to control the schools, to abridge freedom of speech and religion, to promote the attackers' regime as legitimate, and to control the society's independent institutions.

General resistance by providing guidelines for resistance without the need for specific new instructions would deal with a number of contingencies. These would include situations such as when the initial leadership group has been arrested or executed, or when communications with the general population have been blocked, or when it is impossible to organize people to apply specific acts of resistance.

In addition to "general resistance," important aspects of the defense would be conducted on the basis of specific calls or instructions from a leadership group. Defense initiated by such instructions might be termed "organized resistance." Organized resistance activities might include, for example, a planned mass rally, a pastoral letter from church leaders urging resistance, a short symbolic strike, publication of banned newspapers, and defiant radio broadcasts.

Following an attack, much of the defense struggle would occur at

points where the demands of the attackers touched the occupational and professional responsibilities of individuals and institutions. These types of defense could be part of the broad guidelines for general resistance, or at times specific instructions for organized resistance on such points might be issued. Resistance at such points as these often occurred in the prototypical cases described in Chapter Two and other conflicts. For example, with the population conducting the civilian-based defense policy, the invaders would meet a blanket refusal by the government bureaucracy and civil servants to carry out their instructions. Police in open or hidden resistance would refuse to locate and arrest patriotic opponents of the attackers, and would also warn people of impending arrests. Police might selectively reject certain orders, carry them out inefficiently, or in extreme cases brazenly defy the attackers and refuse to obey all their orders.

Workers and managers would use strikes, delays, and obstructionism to impede exploitation of the country—as happened in the Ruhr in 1923.¹⁹ Clergy would preach about the duty to refuse to help the invader—as happened in the Netherlands under the Nazis.²⁰ Politicians, civil servants, and judges, by ignoring or defying the attackers' illegal orders, would keep the normal machinery of government out of their control—as happened in the German resistance to the Kapp Putsch in 1920.²¹ Journalists and printers, refusing to submit to censorship, would publish banned newspapers, newssheets, and other publications illegally in either large or many small editions—as was important in the Russian revolutionary movements of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries and also in several Nazi-occupied countries, including Norway, Denmark, the Netherlands, and Poland.²² Broadcasters and technicians would broadcast free radio programs from hidden transmitters—as happened in Czechoslovakia in August 1968.²³

The attackers would soon discover that they were confronted by a comprehensive fighting force consisting of the general population and the many defiant institutions of the society.

The importance of strategy

These weapons, or methods, employed in civilian-based defense are not to be applied in a hodgepodge, improvised, or simply intuitive way in accordance with the whims of individuals or in response to

accidental events. Instead, these methods will be most effective if they are applied as component parts of a comprehensive plan of defense, that is, a carefully chosen defense strategy.

With civilian-based defense planning, defenders can pinpoint the likely objectives of potential attackers and their possible strategies. This would enable the defenders to devise counterstrategies and resistance options before an attack occurs. Planning can also lead to the development of alternative strategies and contingency plans that would allow defenders to maintain the initiative in a civilian-based defense struggle. Strategic analyses in peacetime would greatly increase the defenders' power under conditions of external or internal attack.

Attempting to provide defense without formulating and applying a strategy is foolhardy. It is also potentially disastrous. One of the major reasons for the failure of some past nonviolent struggles has been the neglect to develop a strategy or the choice of a poor one. Strategy is just as important in civilian-based defense struggles as it is in military warfare.

There needs to be an overall plan for coordinating and directing all appropriate and available resources to attain objectives in a conflict. This is called a *grand strategy*. It includes attention to the rightness of the cause, the choice of what pressures and sanctions to apply, selection of the technique of action, setting the basic framework for the selection of strategies, and the allocation of general tasks and resources in the conflict. Within the *grand strategy*, individual *strategies* need to be formulated to achieve major objectives in the conflict or for conducting broad phases of the struggle. A strategy is a conception, a broad plan, of how best to act in order to achieve one's objectives in a conflict. The aim is to use one's resources to maximum advantage to gain one's objective at minimum cost. The chosen strategy determines whether, when, and how to fight.

Then, particular *tactics* (plans for limited actions) and specific *methods* are used to implement the strategy.

Strategies for civilian-based defense need to be planned with much thought and extreme care. Strategists need to draw upon the best available resources about strategic principles. They need to possess in-depth knowledge of nonviolent struggle and of the conflict situation. Strategists must also be acutely aware of the strengths and weaknesses both of the defending population and of the attackers.

Strategies of civilian-based defense

The first phase. One basic principle of civilian-based defense against internal usurpation and foreign aggression is denial of legitimacy to the attackers. Applied in action, this translates into massive noncooperation and disobedience. But that alone is not a strategy of defense. General noncooperation and defiance must be refined and adapted into several possible strategies.

Strategies will vary according to the nature of the defense struggle. Strategies for defense against a coup d'état, for example, may be somewhat different than strategies against a foreign military invasion. Against a coup, it would be extremely important to offer an immediate, strong and solid defense in order to prevent the putschists from becoming accepted as the government and from their establishing effective control over the state apparatus and the society as a whole.

More concretely, anti-coup defense would require a strategy of repudiation and rejection of the putschists and their attack. At the outset of a coup attempt, the citizenry can refuse to accept the usurpers' government; deny them legitimacy and submission; and conduct massive civilian protests, strikes, and civil disobedience. Civil servants and police can refuse to work for the putschists, and soldiers can refuse to participate in the illegal attack. Local, regional, and provincial governments could officially denounce the coup as illegitimate and refuse to recognize the orders and regulations issued by the putschists. By advance international arrangements, other governments could refuse diplomatic recognition of the putschists and declare a prohibition on economic aid. Carried out thoroughly, these types of resistance can prevent the consolidation of the coup and cause its collapse, as the prototypic cases sketched in Chapter Two revealed. Putschists require a significant degree of legitimacy and cooperation from the society to consolidate their power. If that legitimacy and cooperation are denied, the putsch may die of political starvation.

In the case of a foreign invasion, similar but not fully identical strategies are available for the initial period. One of these is a "nonviolent blitzkrieg." This strategy, also called "total noncooperation," is applied only at special points in a civilian-based defense struggle. This is a strategy of sharp, full noncooperation with the attackers, essentially as recommended for an anti-coup strategy. Applied at the begin-

ning of a defense struggle against invasion it may be intended to shock the attackers, demonstrating the extent and depth of the defense they will face. This strategy will also have a communicative function, informing the leadership of the attackers that the defense will be serious and especially difficult to defeat, so that they had best withdraw. This strategy will also communicate to the ordinary soldiers and functionaries, whose disaffection and mutiny are desired, that their lives will not be threatened.

This strategy may use numerous nonviolent weapons, such as a general strike, an economic shutdown (by both workers and managers), evacuation of cities, stay-at-homes, paralysis of the political system, persistent adherence to pre-attack policies and laws (ignoring those of the attackers), filling streets with demonstrators, conversely leaving the streets completely empty, massive subversion of the attackers' troops and functionaries, defiant publication of newspapers and broadcasts by radio and television with news of the attack and resistance, and others.

While such methods may effectively communicate resistance intentions and methods, only rarely, if ever, are they likely to prove sufficient to force the attackers to call a quick retreat. In addition, if a general strike or economic shut-down is applied for an extended period, it can imperil the capacity of the attacked society to survive its own defense. Therefore, a total noncooperation strategy against invasion would not be permanent. Instead, after its use in the initial stages of defense, this strategy would be halted and held in reserve for possible use at a later point in the struggle. It might be used again, for example, after the perpetration of extreme brutalities by the attackers, or when it was suspected that a massive and dramatic expression of resistance might strike a final blow to the attack.

In general, there are more reasons to continue a strategy of total noncooperation for a longer period in face of an internal coup d'état (which the defenders should attempt to defeat at its onset) than in cases of foreign invasion, which involve opponents whose bases of power lie outside the attacked country.

An alternative strategy at the beginning of foreign invasions might be a strategy of "communication and warning." Words and symbolic actions would be used to communicate the will to resist, indicate the type of defense that would be waged, and urge withdrawal. The following methods could be employed in such a strategy:

leaflets, letters, radio and television broadcasts, personal conversations, newspapers, posters, banners, diplomatic messages, statements at United Nations meetings, third-party assistance, painted messages and slogans, and special types of demonstrations that could communicate despite language barriers. These could be aimed at the attackers' troops, leaders, home population, and potential domestic supporters of the attack.

If a rapid victory does not follow the nonviolent blitzkrieg strategy, the defenders will, nevertheless, have achieved something significant: the mobilization of their own forces and the communication of both their intent to resist and the special character of their defense policy. Those gains are similar to the results of a strategy of communication and warning. At this point it would be time to shift to another strategy, one more suited to the coming longer-term struggle and more able to counter the attackers' specific objectives.

Sustained struggle. No matter how well prepared, the initial defense campaign is to be regarded as simply the opening phase of a struggle that, like a military campaign, may require a longer period of intense effort to achieve victory. In the event that the attack does not collapse in the initial phase of resistance, a shift in defense strategy is required to be able to carry on a sustained defense.

Defense planners will need to formulate strategies that aim to defeat the attackers' specific objectives. Defeat of efforts to control the state apparatus, and to use it to achieve some other objective, is of course a major goal in all cases of civilian-based defense. More specifically, however, if the attackers' objective is, for example, economic exploitation, then defense plans need to concentrate on blocking that aim. Targeting particular forms of resistance to deny specific objectives of the attackers will produce a strategy of "selective resistance," sometimes called "resistance at key points."

"Total noncooperation" is not a viable long-term strategy and must be at most reserved for special points in the struggle, as discussed with the strategy of nonviolent blitzkrieg. In its place, vigorous and skilled application of selective resistance coupled with subversion of the attackers' functionaries and troops is likely to be a more viable and ultimately more effective defense strategy.

Shifting strategies

A given defense struggle may be short or long, depending on diverse factors. As stated, shifts in strategy by the civilian defenders may be required at certain points to counter new objectives or measures of the attackers, to correct for exposed weaknesses or capitalize advantageously on unexpected strengths among the defenders, or to maximize the strength and impact of the defenders' resistance. As with military conflict, genuine power capacity and defense strength are required in civilian-based defense.

The fact that the defense is conducted by nonviolent, instead of violent, struggle will not endear the defenders to the attackers. On the contrary, the aggressors' difficulties in dealing with that type of struggle may not only make the attackers wish the defenders would use violence, but may also lead them to increase the severity of the repression. The defenders must expect the attackers to use any means they think will halt, neutralize, or crush the resistance.

As discussed in the following chapter, the civilian defenders must be prepared to persist in the defense struggle despite any and all repression. It is the combination of persistent defiance and strong nonviolent discipline that creates the strongest defense. It is this combination that can make the costs of the attack unacceptable to the attackers, can prevent them from achieving their objectives, and can force them to desist. In extreme cases, strict persistence and discipline can even lead to a dissolution of the attackers' forces and regime.

Although some civilian-based defense struggles may be relatively brief, as the prototypical cases against coups described in Chapter Two suggest, defenders must be prepared for a prolonged and difficult struggle. In the face of harsh repression and casualties, sections of the defending population may become discouraged, tired, and demoralized, as occurred in the improvised German struggle in the Ruhr in 1923.

During a prolonged defense struggle it may be necessary to shift the strategy from time to time to help maintain defense will, vigor, and effectiveness. Perhaps, for example, the responsibility for public action can be shifted from one population group that is tiring to another which is more able to take on the brunt of the struggle. Perhaps the defense might be concentrated on fewer or narrower issues for a time, so that larger parts of the population could be relieved of the heaviest pressures.

Even under the worst circumstances, it is important that the defense struggle continue in some way. Under very extreme conditions, the defense might simply take the form of "cultural resistance"—holding on to important elements of the people's way of life, language, social organization, beliefs, and observances. If the institutions and organizations of the defenders, which provided the structural bases of the resistance, have been neutralized, controlled, or even destroyed, the resistance must not stop. "Surrender" is not in the vocabulary of civilian defenders. In extremely repressive times, nonviolent acts of defense might be conducted by very small groups, even temporary ones, or by single individuals. This has been called "micro-resistance."²⁴

In case of such dismal times for the defense it is important to maintain the spirit of the people, their desire to regain control of their own society, and a confidence, however shaky, that they will be able to do so. Serious research and analysis are required on how best to deal with such extreme situations. The recent revival of national will to struggle to regain lost independence as successfully demonstrated in the Baltics, East Central Europe, and in many former Soviet republics is evidence that brighter days sometimes do lie ahead despite the bleakness of a current tragic situation. The civilian defenders should always look toward development of more powerful resistance.

Even during difficult phases of a struggle, certain important changes may be developing unseen that can aid the defenders. These may include the appearance or heightening of doubts, internal disagreements, and dissension within the attackers' own camp. In time, circumstances may change, unexpected events may occur, and new resistance initiatives and renewed spirits and energies may lead to a revival of large-scale defense efforts.

Sometimes, favorable developments may require a shift to a more ambitious strategy. As noted, there may be times when the defenders need to aggravate exposed weaknesses in the opponents' camp or to capitalize on the defenders' own new found strength. Thus, the defenders could launch additional selective resistance campaigns so as to fight on a broader front. At certain stages, the defenders may greatly increase pressure on the attackers' troops and functionaries aimed to promote further their collapse as reliable instruments of the attackers' rule. When the attackers' control or will has weakened significantly, it may be time to launch another nonviolent blitzkrieg or

total noncooperation campaign. Whether this proves to be a final blow, or instead another phase of the conflict followed by another selective resistance strategy, it is vital for the defenders to contemplate carefully how to bring the defense struggle to a successful conclusion.

Issues of strategy are more varied and complex than indicated here, and readers facing strategic decisions are urged to study fuller discussions elsewhere.²⁵ Civilian-based defense planners need not only to learn in depth the dynamics of nonviolent struggle against ruthless attackers, but also to become astute and shrewd strategists. That knowledge and wisdom will enable them to make their maximum contributions to the defense struggle.



5

DISCIPLINE, REPRESSION, AND SUCCESS

Temptation and provocation to violence

In cases where the defenders are relying only on civilian-based defense, there may often be temptations to use some violence against the attackers or their collaborators. It may be thought that the overall defense will be stronger if some violence is added to the otherwise nonviolent struggle. Or, faced with violent oppression, some resisters may advocate violence out of desperation. Others may argue that the definition of national independence includes the state's ability to organize and muster military capacity.

None of these arguments is necessarily valid, and if accepted, any or all of them could lead to disaster. The advocates of these views may be sincere, but they evidence lack of understanding of the grand strategic requirement of the technique of nonviolent struggle: courageous struggle must be combined with nonviolent discipline. In a conflict, violence employed by the side that is otherwise using nonviolent struggle is highly counterproductive. The two techniques—violent and nonviolent—operate in fundamentally different ways. The requirements for effective violent struggle, such as large-scale physical destruction and the killing of enemy troops, will undermine the effectiveness of nonviolent struggle.

The introduction of violence on the part of the resisters is likely to counter, if not reverse, both the process of political jiu-jitsu (discussed later in this chapter) and the operation of the very special mechanisms of change of the technique of nonviolent action. Success in civilian-based defense depends to a high degree on the persistence of the

defenders in fighting with their own methods. By adopting violence, the defenders have in effect consented to fight on the opponents' terms. This hands the initiative to the enemy.²⁶

The perpetration of violence by the resisters will also be used to "justify" overwhelming repression which the attackers wanted to use anyhow. The aggressors may claim that they are saving the country from terrorism or civil war, and preserving "law and order." Internationally, such violence will be exploited as an excuse for "self-defense" against the "violent attacks" from the victimized country (although that claim of "self-defense" in reality is used to cloak aggression).

Resistance violence may also help unite the attackers' home population and military forces against the defenders. International sympathy and support for the defenders may be drastically reduced. The numbers of one's own people willing and able to participate in the defense struggle are likely to be fewer with violence than with a strategy of fully nonviolent resistance.

In contrast, maintenance of nonviolent resistant behavior is likely to contribute to: winning sympathy and support, reducing casualties, inducing disaffections and even mutiny of the opponents' troops, and attracting maximum participation in the nonviolent struggle.

Recognizing that violence undermines the dynamics and strength of nonviolent resistance, governments, political police, occupation officials, and the like often deliberately seek to provoke resisters to use violence. Violence, or violent intentions, are often falsely attributed to resisters. Brutal repression is frequently employed to goad resisters into violent reactions. If brutal repression is insufficient to provoke violent resistance, the opponents' police may plant false evidence in the form of guns, bombs, documents, and the like among resisters to "prove" the intent to use violence.

At other times, agents provocateurs are placed within the resistance groups to instigate or even commit acts of violence in order to "prove" the charge that the resisters are using violence. For example, under the Russian Empire the Ochrana (the tsarist Russian secret police) in combatting the Finnish movement for independence arranged for agents provocateurs to commit violence against Russians, and also to provoke the Finns to adopt violence. The aim was to help justify savage repression.²⁷ The Nazis (of all people) were constantly attributing violence to their opponents, domestic and international, to cloak the extremity of their own violence and aggression.²⁸

Repression as a step to victory

Aggressors facing concerted noncooperation and defiance may be seriously threatened. Therefore, the aggressors are likely to respond with repression. The killings by Soviet troops in Vilnius and Riga in January 1991 are among the most recent tragic examples of this. Nonviolent defiance often risks casualties, sometimes serious ones, but almost always produces far fewer casualties than when both sides use violence.

Casualties in nonviolent struggles also are largely or entirely civilian. All evidence indicates that however extreme they may be at times, the numbers of dead and wounded are but a small fraction of the civilian casualties occurring in military confrontations. Virtually every military war for many decades has seen a drastic increase in civilian as compared to military casualties. Therefore, if we are to avoid most of the casualties of war while providing effective means of defense, we are required to consider civilian-based defense.

The aggressors' repressive measures—arrests, imprisonment, beatings, concentration camps, shootings, and executions, for example—are grave and painful, but in themselves are not decisive. In fact, the opponents' repression is evidence of the power of nonviolent action, and is no more reason for despair than if, in a regular war, the enemy shoots back, wounding and killing soldiers. In addition to the aggressors' intention to provoke resisters into using self-defeating violence, the repression may often be intended to crush resistance, to intimidate people and to instill fear. The Chinese saying is: "Kill the chicken to scare the monkey." However, if the resisters and population refuse to be intimidated into submission and passivity, then the repression will fail.

Repression of resisters that maintain their nonviolent discipline can at times have the opposite effect of that intended by the repressor. In this situation there is a strong tendency for the opponents' violence and repression to rebound against their own power position. The sharp contrast between the brutality of the repressors and the nonviolent behavior of the resisters exposes the repressors' actions in the worst possible light.

This situation triggers the special process of "political jiu-jitsu." Since the attackers' violent repression is met with neither surrender and flight nor with violent resistance, their violence rebounds against

them politically. This process is likely to cause more dissension in the attackers' own ranks, more unity and resistance among the defenders and their supporters, and more sympathy and aid from third parties. The process of political jiu-jitsu has been observed in numerous cases of nonviolent struggle. In the 1989 Czech and Slovak "velvet revolution," for example, the brutal suppression of nonviolent demonstrators in Prague by riot police on 17 November was credited with galvanizing political opposition to the hard-line Communist regime.²⁹

Against disciplined and persistent nonviolent actionists, the opponents' violence can never really come to grips with the kind of struggle being waged. If repression makes more people join the resistance, the numbers of civilian defenders may grow so large that control becomes impossible. The attackers' own supporters may become uneasy, disobey, and even defect. Police officers may refuse to repress further the resisters, officials may resign, and in extreme cases the opponents' troops may even mutiny. Massive nonviolent defiance by the population may have by then made the attackers' government powerless.

International support

International publicity sympathetic to the nonviolent resisters may be stimulated or strengthened by the process of political jiu-jitsu. This can lead to more continuous and sympathetic foreign news coverage, and at times to international diplomatic and economic pressures against the attackers. In the early days of Solidarity in Poland, the KOR (Committee for the Defense of Workers, dissolved in Autumn 1981) and the dramatic strike and protest activities of Solidarity helped to keep attention on this dramatic story of nonviolent popular defiance of a Communist regime.

International support may at times assist nonviolent struggles. International economic sanctions on South Africa, for example, especially from 1986 to 1991, have been credited with adding to the economic and political pressures on the Pretoria government caused by the internal South African anti-apartheid movements.

However, there should be no romanticism about the power of international public opinion or even international diplomatic and economic pressure. There are many cases in which aggressors and

internal dictatorships have brazenly continued their oppression and repression, and even initiated new brutalities, in defiance of world-wide condemnation.

Powerful forces on many levels stand in the way of smaller nations seeking to regain and defend their independence. For example, Lithuanians infused with a sense of the obvious justice of their cause seemed to assume that the world would immediately and enthusiastically welcome their declaration of independence in March 1990. No government, however, rushed to recognize the new state. Difficult months followed, with new acts of aggression and resistance, sometimes with casualties. It was only in the aftermath of the failed coup in August 1991 that Lithuania received the widespread recognition it deserved.

On the international level, states have many competing interests that may preclude their active support of nonviolent resistance movements. This is certainly true of major military powers, which are often reluctant to support secessionist struggles against other major states. This accounts for the very long refusal, until September 1991, of the United States government to recognize the independence of the Baltic nations and its continuing refusal to this date (February 1992) to recognize the independence of Tibet in the face of Chinese annexation.

Civilian-based defense would strongly assist in the mobilization of world public opinion and support. Any nonviolent support for nations waging civilian-based defense would be welcomed and helpful. However, the defending countries must still depend primarily on their own efforts to gain victory and recognition. It remains true that the defense struggle must be planned and conducted in such a powerful and responsible manner that even if there is no significant international assistance, the defenders can still win.

Success

Success depends on several key factors. These include, among others, the spirit of resistance; the solidarity of the defending population; the strength of the defending society; the ability of the people to maintain resistance, nonviolent discipline, and to withstand repression; the vulnerabilities of the attackers; and the wisdom of the defense strategies.

The resistance of a prepared people and their institutions may finally prove to be too much for the attackers. The attackers' objectives may be denied to them. The attackers' effort to establish necessary control over the society may fail and merely have placed them in a political hornets' nest. Continued repression in the occupied country could feed further resistance. The numbers of noncooperating and disobedient "subjects" may steadily grow. It may finally become clear that the defenders are headed for victory, with their freedom more vital and durable than before the crisis.

When the attackers fail to bring the civilian-based defense country to heel, a miasma of uncertainty and dissent could grow among the attackers' regime, soldiers, and officials. The attackers' own cohesiveness and support may unravel, weakening them gravely at the very time that the defense has grown stronger. When the attackers see that they may lose, they may commit new brutalities in efforts to crush the defense struggle or simply out of anger or frustration. In other cases, when they see that they cannot win, the attackers may seek to withdraw before a debacle occurs. The economic costs of the continued attack may be too high to justify in light of limited gain. The political costs may become unacceptable.

While the defenders should not expect too much from international support, under some conditions, international pressures could further weaken the oppressors and strengthen the civilian defenders.

When successful, civilian-based defense of the society would lead to geographical withdrawal of the invaders or collapse of the internal usurpers. This victory would follow from the successful direct defense of the society itself. The apparent control that resulted from the easy dispersion of the attackers' military forces is then revealed to have been a mirage.

These chapters have presented only broad outlines and illustrations of possible forms that civilian-based defense might take. Each case would have its special characteristics. The attackers' objectives, of course, would differ with each situation. Obviously, there can be no one blueprint for all circumstances. It would be important in peacetime to prepare contingency plans for meeting different types of attacks and to contemplate various possible strategies for dealing with diverse threats and contingencies.

Victory with this policy will come only to those who have developed it into a refined and powerful political tool. Defeat of the civilian

defenders is always possible, just as defeat occurs in traditional war. However, there are strong signs that a determined people can have greater chances of achieving success, and with less cost in casualties and destruction, with a civilian-based defense policy than with a military defense policy.

6

A SUPERIOR FORM OF DEFENSE

Consideration and adoption: a transpartisan approach

Whether the proposal is to add a civilian-based resistance component or to transarm to a full civilian-based defense policy, the presentation, consideration, and decision should not be made on an ideological or partisan basis. Instead, civilian-based options in defense need to be presented and evaluated in a “transpartisan” manner—not tied to any doctrinal outlook or narrow group.³⁰ In particular, the policy should in no way be presented as a pacifist or anti-military concept. On the contrary, in several countries military officers have taken serious, positive interest in the policy. If these civilian-based options are presented on the basis of their potential utility—without ideological baggage—such a component or policy might well receive widespread support across much or all of the political spectrum in a democratic society.

Widespread support in the society for a civilian-based resistance component is a realistic expectation, as potential was demonstrated by the unanimous decision of the Swedish parliament in 1986 to adopt a “nonmilitary resistance” component within Sweden’s “total defense” policy.³¹ (In contrast, in the early 1970s in Sweden, presentations of nonviolent struggle for defense were at times made on a highly partisan basis, resulting—according to the late Defense Minister Sven Anderson—in a ten year set back in consideration of the policy.)

Beyond adoption, a transpartisan approach would aim to incorporate people and groups holding diverse perspectives in support of the development and implementation of the component or policy. All

sectors of the society ought to play important roles not only in evaluating the component or full policy but, if adopted, in preparing and implementing the new defense element. It should be remembered that the diverse independent organizations and institutions of the society will be the prime bodies responsible for carrying out the future policy, not special professional forces. Hence, the support and full involvement of those varied independent bodies is crucial in the development and implementation of the component or full policy, regardless of their religious, political, or other differences.

What are the possible patterns of adoption of civilian-based defense in the Baltics, East Central Europe, and the Commonwealth of Independent States?

For countries such as Russia, Poland, Hungary, and Czechoslovakia, which already have large military establishments, a rapid full adoption of civilian-based defense is virtually impossible. However, the ability of even these countries independently to defend themselves against both internal and external threats could be significantly increased by the addition of a civilian-based resistance component to their predominantly military defense policies. This would minimally contribute to greater capacity for defense-in-depth, help keep defense expenditures manageable, and support a policy of maximum self-reliance in defense. Furthermore, in such countries whatever their international defense policy might be, they would gain significantly by adopting a civilian-based resistance component specifically to defend against attempted coups d'état.

For countries with existing military capacities, the process of changing over from an existing military-based defense policy to civilian-based defense is called *transarmament*. "Disarmament," if understood as the reduction or abandonment of real defense capacity (as distinct from military weaponry), is not involved. Although at certain stages in the process there would be reductions in prior military systems, actual defense capacity would not be diminished, but increased, as the superior civilian-based defense system is introduced.

For such countries beginning with a significant military system, full adoption of civilian-based defense is usually conceived to be achieved by the incremental process of *transarmament*. A small civilian resistance component may first be added to the otherwise military-based defense policy. Then, that small component may be gradually expanded in responsibilities and size. Eventually, the mili-

tary components may be judged to be superfluous and even counter-productive, and hence can be phased out fully.

Problems would be encountered during such a transition. When civilian-based resistance components have been incorporated alongside large military components, the problems intrinsic to mixing some violence with nonviolent struggle would make it necessary to separate the military action and the civilian action as much as possible. The separation can be at least partially accomplished by distancing the two types of action in time—for example, the nonviolent struggle against an invader might start after military resistance has ceased—or by separation in purposes—for example, civilian-based defense might be reserved for resistance against internal coups while military means are designated against foreign aggressors. This separation is still not fully satisfactory in terms of effectiveness, and attention is still required to the tension between the two techniques of defense.

In other situations, however, when a country does not possess a significant military capacity this model of transarmament does not apply. Newly independent countries without an inherited military force—such as Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia—may consider freely what defense policy would be most realistic, affordable, and effective. Such countries might want to adopt directly a full policy of civilian-based defense, if only because in facing potential attackers they may have no realistic military option capable of actually defending their societies. This may be due either to a lack of military capacities and economic resources to procure them or due to the overwhelming military power of potential aggressors. Civilian-based defense may be their only viable defense option. The adoption of civilian-based defense and preparations for it could then be made rapidly.

For countries without developed military systems, adoption of full civilian-based defense would have several distinct advantages. The economic cost would be low. Yet, the effective deterrence and defense capacities would be much higher than they could produce by military preparations (especially in regard to their potential adversaries).

Another important reason why newly independent countries currently without military systems should not embark on establishing them relates to the internal democracy of those societies. If, say, a newly established or expanded military establishment will be incapable of really providing external defense, then the role remaining for

it is internal. That is, it would be a powerful institution within that national society and could become a force of repression. As mentioned, such a force could act against the democratic government in a coup d'état. This would make the hard-won new independence taste bitter.

In contrast, a policy of civilian-based defense would not create a military establishment capable of attempting a coup d'état. Furthermore, this policy would provide an effective means of deterring or defeating any political coup or executive usurpation. This anti-coup capacity, combined with the participation of the population and the society's institutions in civilian-based defense, would contribute to the development of a more vital internal democracy.

For these countries that lack a realistic military option, attempting to create both a serious military-based policy and also a developed civilian-based defense capacity could produce difficult problems. The division of limited resources and personnel between the two policies could produce problems (although the civilian policy would always be much less expensive). Also, as already noted, the military and civilian policies often operate in contradictory ways; in an actual struggle the military means will tend to undermine major parts of the dynamics of nonviolent struggle.

Defeating coups and other usurpations

One defense need in all the countries of East Central Europe, the Baltics, and the Commonwealth of Independent States is protection against internal attacks. Traditional military means of defense provide no answer to the dangers of internal attacks short of civil war, which the forces of democracy are likely to lose. As noted earlier, civilian-based defense is probably the most effective way to combat internal take-overs. These may appear as coups d'état, or as declarations of martial law intended to halt the trends toward increasing democracy.

Illegitimate take-overs are well known in the history of the Baltics, East Central Europe, and the former Soviet Union. The Bolsheviks came to power in Russia with the coup d'état of October 1917. In 1926 right-wing army officers imposed a state of emergency and disbanded the government in Lithuania.³² The Czechoslovak Communist Party seized state control in 1948 through a coup d'état, and in Poland a

period of severe repression against Solidarity was launched by a military coup on 12 December 1981.

There are strong grounds for these countries to adopt this civilian-based defense to prevent and thwart internal attacks on the emerging democratic systems. Indeed, in several countries in these regions, the populations are now politicized and aware of this power through the experiences of their independence and democracy struggles. There are strong reasons to believe that they would be capable of waging successful civilian-based defense against future attempts to subvert newly formed constitutional democratic governments, as the defeat of the Soviet coup in August 1991 illustrates.

Three of the prototypical examples of improvised noncooperation for defense described in Chapter Two were against coups d'état. In Germany (1920), France (1961), and the Soviet Union (1991) improvised civilian resistance proved to be a powerful means of combatting internal attacks. Planned and prepared anti-coup defenses would have the potential to be even more effective.

Interest in civilian-based defense

Is it realistic to expect that both popular and official interest in civilian-based policy options will develop and grow in the countries of the Baltics, East Central Europe, and the Commonwealth of Independent States? There are indications that it will.

Serious interest in civilian-based resistance components within predominantly military policies and also in full civilian-based defense policies has grown significantly over the past three decades in various countries. There are now signs that this interest is maturing into a still modest but higher level of public, political, military, and governmental consideration.

Research has already begun on a small scale in a few Western European countries and in the United States. Political and governmental interest has often exceeded the progress in research. Austria, Switzerland, and Yugoslavia have at one time or another recognized this type of resistance (called by various names) as a small part of their total defense policies. In recent decades, Norway, Denmark, France, the Netherlands, and Finland, have undertaken limited governmental or semi-official studies. Sweden, as mentioned earlier, has already

adopted a civilian-based resistance component into its "total defense" policy. In nearly all these cases, the policy has been seen only as a component of predominantly military-based defense postures.

Civilian-based defense has been recognized as relevant to the changing political setting in Europe, especially as a civilian-based resistance component. Johan Jørgen Holst, Norwegian defense minister, has stated:

Civilian-based defense has the potential of constituting an important complement to traditional military forms of defense. As the destructiveness of war makes deliberate large-scale war in Europe highly unlikely, civilian-based defense adds to the deterrence of occupation by increasing the costs and burdens for the potential occupant. Recent events in Eastern Europe have demonstrated the ability of modern societies to mobilize their populations in a manner that attracts the immediate attention of the whole world.³³

The steps taken in Lithuania during the independence struggle demonstrate that full civilian-based defense is possible in such a country. Several key points of a civilian-based defense policy were contained in a resolution adopted on 28 February 1991, by the Supreme Council (parliament) of Lithuania. These included a provision that in case of an active Soviet occupation "only laws adopted by the Supreme Council of the Republic of Lithuania are valid." The main provisions read:

1. To consider illegal all governing structures created in Lithuania by the USSR or its collaborators, and invalid all the laws, decrees or other acts, court decisions and administrative orders issued by them and directed at Lithuania.
2. All government institutions of the Republic of Lithuania and their officials are obligated not to cooperate with the occupying forces and the individuals who serve their regime.
3. In the event a regime of active occupation is introduced, citizens of the Republic of Lithuania are asked to adhere to principles of disobedience, nonviolent resistance, and political and social noncooperation as the primary means of struggle for independence."³⁴

In an additional clause, the Supreme Council did leave open the possibility that citizens of Lithuania could use "all available methods and means to defend themselves," a situation which if expressed in violence could quickly erode the unity and strength of a concerted civilian-based defense posture. In a further clause, the Supreme Council stated that, if possible, organized resistance would be launched on instructions of the provisional defense leadership of Lithuania. As of early 1992, Lithuanian defense planners were continuing their consideration of the possible role of a civilian-based resistance capacity in their long-term defense policy.

The government of Latvia, during the independence struggle, also took steps toward adoption of a policy with strong similarities to civilian-based defense. In June 1991, the Latvian Supreme Council (parliament) officially created a "Center for Nonviolent Resistance," the main tasks of which would be (1) to create an emergency structure of instructors and organizers of civilian-based defense for crisis situations, (2) to prepare printed instructions on conduct during a civilian-based defense struggle, (3) to advise the population in a defense crisis, and (4) to publish materials on the subject.³⁵ Following recognition of Latvian independence, a debate ensued about the proper role of civilian-based defense in Latvian defense planning. The Supreme Council failed to fund the Center at that point. However, the Center officially still remained in existence and active interest among government officials continued.

In Estonia, in January 1991, the discussion of means of defense against a concerted Soviet attack included attention to the Norwegian anti-Nazi resistance during the German occupation. That same month, certain government and Popular Front people devised a resistance plan for the population called "Civilian Disobedience" which was disseminated to the general public on 12 January 1991.

In case of Soviet military action or a coup to oust the independence-minded elected government, the Estonian people were offered basic points to follow in their resistance: to treat all commands contradicting Estonian law as illegitimate; to carry out strict disobedience to and noncooperation with all Soviet attempts to strengthen control; to refuse to supply vital information to Soviet authorities and when appropriate to remove street names, traffic signs, house numbers, etc.; not to be provoked into imprudent action; to document through writing and film Soviet activities and use all possible channels to preserve and internationally distribute such documentation; to preserve the

functioning of Estonia's political and social organizations (e.g., by creating backup organizations and hiding essential equipment); to implement mass action when appropriate; and to undertake creative communication with potentially hostile forces.³⁶

In Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia, high government officials have confirmed that these defense recommendations during the crises of 1991 were based primarily on writings about civilian-based defense, supplemented by other ideas.

In recent years, civilian-based defense has moved into the realm of practical politics and the "thinkable" in the field of national security policies. This has occurred on the levels of research and policy evaluation. For the most part, the question is no longer whether this policy has any relevance for the defense policies of diverse European governments and societies. Rather, the question has become to what extent should this type of resistance be incorporated into existing national policies. For the countries of the Baltics, East Central Europe, and the former Soviet empire civilian-based defense appears to be both timely and profoundly relevant. Civilian-based defense offers a realistic alternative to the creation and expansion of military forces and weaponry in this conflict-filled part of the world. The examples of the violence between Azeris and Armenians over Nagorno-Karabakh, and the war between Croatia and Serbian-dominated Yugoslavia in late 1991 need not be imitated. Nonviolent struggle is not only relevant to the multitude of inter-ethnic conflicts in many of these countries, but it may be required as a way to oppose dictatorial trends within newly independent states, so as to avoid such violence as occurred in independent Georgia in late 1991 and early 1992. By substituting nonviolent means of struggle, realistic conflicts could be recognized and pursued, while avoiding the perils of internecine war.

Citation of the potential merits of civilian-based defense does not imply that this policy is an easy alternative to military means or lacks its own problems and difficulties. Indeed, civilian-based defense ought to be subjected to an examination at least as rigorous as that devoted to any proposal for a major change in defense policy. Concrete examination has to be given to the many practical problems involved in waging civilian-based defense, to possible strategies, to types of anticipated repression, to the question of casualties, and, finally, to the conditions for success and the chances of achieving it.

Present relevance

Civilian-based defense can provide partial or full defense policies for all of the countries of the Baltics, East Central Europe, and the former Soviet Union. These countries are now faced with a reevaluation of their defense needs and policies. In this situation, they should assess carefully the dangers and disadvantages of maintaining large military establishments or of joining regional military alliances. Civilian-based defense is an alternative that may help overcome those disadvantages while still providing an effective means of deterrence and defense.

Without a strong defense policy, the newly independent countries of these regions may again become engulfed by a powerful neighbor or become prey to an internal political or military dictatorship. At the same time, most of these nations are in no position to mount a strong self-reliant defense policy by military means. Indeed, compared to potential attackers, it is hard to imagine that some newly independent countries—such as Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia—could ever develop sufficient military capacity to deter or defeat major aggressors. Even the attempt to do so could produce grave economic deprivation to the population, creating conditions conducive to internal take-overs. In other cases, such as Ukraine, the newly independent country might have sufficient economic resources to muster a powerful military capacity. In fact, Ukrainian officials have announced their intention to establish a large national army and navy. However, one cannot overlook the danger of a proliferation of large national military forces in regions of great economic, social, ethnic, and political instability.

In light of the centuries of Russian domination and a long history of various national and ethnic conflicts, it is almost inevitable that the development of major military forces by these states—even when intended for purely defensive purposes—may well be misperceived as a potential threat to neighboring countries (even if both neighbors are, for example, members of the Commonwealth of Independent States). Civilian-based defense is a policy, which, when fully adopted, can provide a very strong defense capacity without the likelihood of misinterpretation or misrepresentation. A country with a civilian-based defense policy is not equipped for military aggression or revanchist expansion. This important distinction could make a major contribution toward future good will and cooperation among these countries.

Benefits of a civilian-based defense policy

A country with a civilian-based defense policy, or even a civilian-based resistance component, is likely to benefit by the international sharing of research, experience, policy studies, and models of preparation and training. Such a country through this policy would make various gains. It may be useful to summarize some of these which have been pointed out in this booklet.

A country developing a civilian-based defensive capacity with such assistance would not become dependent in its defense on a foreign government, which might have its own, perhaps incompatible, objectives in future conflicts. Instead, the civilian-based defense capacities would help to increase or restore self-reliance in defense, especially to smaller and medium-sized countries.

A decision to prepare for nonviolent struggle for defense would have minimal economic costs, as compared to military options. Additionally, nonviolent struggle would provide ways to pursue existing conflicts within and between these countries without stimulating a movement toward war or replicating tragic situations as in Northern Ireland, Lebanon, and Yugoslavia. These advantages of nonviolent options are all important potential benefits of a civilian-based defense policy for all countries.

The potential of those civilian-based options has wide implications not only for defense and the maintenance of national independence, but also for the vitality of a functioning democracy. By placing a major responsibility for defense on the people themselves, this policy would encourage citizens to recognize qualities of the society worthy of defense, and to consider how any less meritorious aspects could be improved.

In cases of invasion, civilian-based defense would also set in motion restraining influences in the invaders' own country, such as the widening of splits in the regime and, in extreme cases, even the formation of anti-aggression resistance. International support for countries using civilian-based defense against aggression may cause further problems for the attackers.

Countries that adopt civilian-based resistance components or full civilian-based defense, as well as other sympathetic governments, could plan to assist attacked countries. This could be arranged through a Civilian-Based Defense Mutual Assistance Treaty. The pro-

visions of such a treaty-based pact could include commitments and preparations for assistance to attacked members from the other members of the organization.

The types of assistance could include any or all of the following: sharing of research and policy analysis on the problems and potential of such components and full policies and the nature of potential security threats; provision of food and other essential supplies during defense struggles; provision of radio, television, and printing facilities; diplomatic assistance (including through the United Nations) in mobilizing international pressures against the attackers; when appropriate, facilitating international economic sanctions against the attackers; providing medical supplies and services; assisting communication (in case of an invasion) with the attackers' home population, informing them of the nature of the attack and the defense struggle, encouraging anti-attack resistance at home; providing, when needed, modest financial support to the attacked government and society; in the case of key individuals or population groups facing genocide, organizing or assisting escape to another country; providing safe storage for the country's gold resources during the crisis; and serving as communication centers to the world about the events inside the attacked country.

Countries adopting well-prepared and strong civilian-based defense could maintain their political and security policy independence without the need to join a military alliance. Tensions with neighboring countries would not be aggravated by military arms races. The choice to forgo a military attack capacity could have a reassuring effect on anxious neighboring countries.

Because civilian-based resistance components and full civilian-based defense policies add to actual deterrence and defense capacities, any country, no matter how small or large, can adopt the policy by its own decision, without waiting for neighboring countries to do likewise. Although phased adoption through treaty arrangements of neighboring countries is a possible model, this is not necessary. Indeed, the initial introduction of these components or this policy can be done just as a state would add new military weapons, without waiting for its neighbors to do the same. The example of adding civilian-based components then might be followed by other countries, contributing both to their own increased defense capacity and to the reduction of international tensions in the region.

The adoption of civilian-based resistance components and transarmament to full civilian-based defense by the countries of the Baltics, East Central Europe, and the Commonwealth of Independent States could not only help to save these countries from foreign domination. It would also contribute to a more decentralized, less elitist, demilitarized Europe. This would be a Europe more capable not only of deterring and defending against foreign attacks, but also of maintaining its internal democracy. The adoption of civilian-based defense could contribute to the decentralization of economic and political power, and the preservation of traditional and chosen cultures, ways of life, and languages of all members of the European family.

With fundamental changes going on in these countries, most people would agree that this is not a time for complacency. Serious security questions will continue to face them. They cannot ignore potential dangers. They have an opportunity to consider the possible advantages offered by a new policy of realism.

Civilian-based defense provides an alternative:

- to helplessness in the face of danger and aggression,
- to war, regardless of in whose name it is waged,
- to submission of the militarily weaker nations to the more powerful ones, and
- to economic disaster produced by efforts to obtain costly military weaponry.

Instead, this policy can potentially provide a powerful means of deterrence and defense against would-be attackers, with very limited economic cost.

The exploration of the policy potential of civilian-based resistance components and of full civilian-based defense is one of the most important defense tasks that a society, its institutions, and its government could undertake in these times of transition.

With the dramatic events of 1989 and 1990, and the continuing political movements in the former Soviet dominated territories, a need exists for fresh thinking about defense. A major opportunity for such thinking now exists and it may be to the benefit of all concerned to use it constructively and responsibly.

An alternative new policy of defense can now be provided through a refinement of people power, producing a more effective, sophisticated, and powerful defense policy. It is a defense policy based on people, not bombs, on human institutions, not military

technology, serving freedom, not threatening annihilation. Civilian-based defense is a creative defense based on the power of people even in grave crises to become, and remain, the masters of their own destinies.

NOTES

1. Yugoslavia lost about 10.6 percent of its population during the war. These fatalities included many inter-partisan killings as well. Adam Roberts, *Nations in Arms: The Theory and Practice of Territorial Defence*. Second edition (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1986 [1976]), p. 140.

2. Literature about "defensive defense" includes the following: Jonathan Dean, "Alternative Defence: Answer to NATO's Central Front Problems?" *International Affairs*, vol. 64, no. 1 (Winter 1987), pp. 61-88; Stephen J. Flanagan, "Nonprovocative and Civilian-Based Defense," in Joseph S. Nye, Jr., Graham T. Allison, and Albert Carnesale, editors, *Fateful Visions* (Cambridge, Mass.: Ballinger, 1988), pp. 93-109; Frank Barnaby and Egbert Boeker, "Defence Without Offence" (Bradford, England: University of Bradford, Peace Studies Paper No. 8, 1982; Horst Afheldt, *Defensive Verteidigung* (Reinbek, Hamburg: Rowohlt Taschenbuch Verlag, 1983); Anders Boserup, "Non-Offensive Defense in Research, Working Paper No. 5, 1985); Norbert Hannig, "Verteidigung ohne zu Bedrohen," (Universität Stuttgart: Arbeitsgruppe Friedensforschung und Europäische Sicherheit, Paper No. 5, 1986); Hans Heinrich Nolte and Wilhelm Nolte, *Ziviler Widerstand und Autonome Abwehr* (Baden-Baden: Nomos Verlag, 1984); Lutz Unterseher, *Defending Europe* (Bonn: Studiengruppe Alternative Sicherheitspolitik, 1986).

3. Commander Sir Stephen King-Hall, "Common Sense in Defence" (pamphlet) (London: K-H Services, 1960), p. 23. Sir Stephen's use of the term referred to facing the truth that nuclear war would be something "basically and absolutely different" from any previous war.

4. This account is based on Wilfred Harris Crook, *The General Strike* (Chapel Hill, N.C.: University of North Carolina Press, 1931), pp. 496-527; Donald Goodspeed, *The Conspirators* (New York: Viking, 1962), pp. 108-188; Erich Eyck, *A History of the Weimar Republic* (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1962), vol. 1, pp. 129-160; Karl Roloff (pseud.: Karl Ehrlich), "Den Ikkevoldelige Modstand: den Kvalte Kapp-Kupet," in K. Ehrlich, N. Lindberg, and G. Jacobsen, editors, *Kamp Uden Vaaben* (Copenhagen: Levin & Munksgaard, Einar Munksgaard, 1937), pp. 194-213; and John Wheeler-Bennett, *The Nemesis of Power* (New York: St. Martin's Press,

1953), pp. 63-82. See also Gene Sharp, *The Politics of Nonviolent Action* (Boston: Porter Sargent, 1973), pp. 40-41 and 79-81.

5. This account is based on that of Adam Roberts, "Civil Resistance to Military Coups," *Journal of Peace Research* (Oslo), vol. xii, no. 1 (1975), pp. 19-36. All quotations are from that source.

6. This account is based on that of Wolfgang Sternstein, "The Ruhrkampf of 1923," in Adam Roberts, editor, *The Strategy of Civilian Defence* (London: Faber & Faber, 1967) and U. S. edition: *Civilian Resistance as a National Defense* (Harrisburg, Pennsylvania: 1968), pp. 106-135.

7. This account is based on Robert Littell, editor, *The Czech Black Book* (New York: Praeger, 1969); Robin Remington, editor, *Winter in Prague* (Cambridge, Mass.: M.I.T. Press, 1969); and Vladimir Horsky, *Prag 1968* (Stuttgart: Ernst Klett Verlag and Munich: Kösel-Verlag, 1975). See also H. Gordon Skilling, *Czechoslovakia's Interrupted Revolution* (Princeton, N. J.: Princeton University Press, 1976).

8. This account of the August 1991 Soviet coup has been prepared by Bruce Jenkins. It is compiled from the following sources: *The Boston Globe*, 20-23 August 1991; *The Economist*, 24-30 August 1991; Stuart H. Loory and Ann Imse, *Seven Days That Shook The World*, CNN Reports, (Atlanta: Turner Publishing, Inc.: 1991); *Newsweek*, 2 September 1991; *The New Yorker*, 4 November 1991; *The New York Times*, 20-25 August 1991; *Time*, 2 September 1991; *The Washington Post*, 21 August 1991.

9. Jan Karski, *Story of a Secret State* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1944).

10. Karski, *The Story of a Secret State*, p. 235.

11. See Gene Sharp, "Tyranny Could Not Quell Them" (pamphlet) (London: Peace News, 1958 and later editions); Magnus Jensen, "Kampen om Skolen," in Sverre Steen, general editor, *Norges Krig* (Oslo: Gyldendal Norsk Forlag, 1947-1950), vol. III, pp. 73-105; Sverre S. Amundsen, gen. ed., *Kirkenes Ferda*, 1942 (Oslo: J. W. Cappelens Forlag, 1946); and Magne Skodvin, general editor, *Norge i Krig*, vol. 4, *Holdningskamp* by Beit Nøkleby (Oslo: H. Aschehoug & Co. [W. Nygaard], 1986), pp. 72-121.

12. See Magne Skodvin, "Norwegian Nonviolent Resistance During the German Occupation," in Adam Roberts, editor, *The Strategy of Civilian Defence/Civilian Resistance as a National Defense*, pp. 141-151; and Thomas Christian Wyller, *Nyordning og Motstand* (Oslo:

Universitetsforlaget, 1958).

13. See, for example, Jeremy Bennett, "The Resistance Against the German Occupation of Denmark 1940-1945," in Adam Roberts, editor, *The Strategy of Civilian Defence/Civilian Resistance as a National Defense*, pp. 154-172

14. See Robert Littell, editor, *The Czech Black Book*, p. 212.

15. Letter from Grazvydas Kirvaitis, 7 March 1991.

16. See Gene Sharp, "Facing Dictatorships with Confidence," in *Social Power and Political Freedom* (Boston: Porter Sargent, 1980), pp. 91-112.

17. This list in part draws upon Karl W. Deutsch, "Cracks in the Monolith: Possibilities and Patterns of Disintegration in Totalitarian Systems," in Carl J. Friedrich, *Totalitarianism* (New York: Universal Library, Grosset & Dunlap, 1964), pp. 308-333. Original edition, Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1954.

18. See Lars Porsholt, "On the Conduct of Civilian Defence," in T. K. Mahadevan, Adam Roberts, and Gene Sharp, editors, *Civilian Defence: An Introduction* (New Delhi: Gandhi Peace Foundation and Bombay: Bharatiya Vidya Bhavan, 1967), pp. 145-149.

19. See Sternstein, "The Ruhrkampf of 1923," pp. 106-135.

20. See Werner Warmbrunn, *The Dutch Under German Occupation 1940-1945* (London: Oxford University Press and Palo Alto, California: Stanford University Press, 1963), pp. 160-161.

21. See Gene Sharp, *The Politics of Nonviolent Action*, pp. 40-41 and 80-81.

22. See Franco Venturi, *Roots of Revolution* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf and London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1960), pp. 178-179 and 748-749 n. 134; Hugh Seton-Watson, *The Decline of Imperial Russia, 1855-1914* (New York: Praeger, and London: Methuen, 1952) passim.; Leonard Schapiro, *The Communist Party of the Soviet Union* (New York: Random House and London: Eyre & Spottiswoode, 1960), passim.; Magne Skodvin, "Norwegian Nonviolent Resistance During the German Occupation," pp. 143-144; Hans Luihn, *De Illegale Avisene* (Oslo and Bergen: Universitetsforlaget, 1960); Hans Kirchoff, Henrik S. Nissen, and Henning Poulsen, *Besættelsestidens Historie* (Copenhagen: Forlaget Fremad, 1964), pp. 113ff.; Werner Warmbrunn, *The Dutch Under German Occupation, 1940-1945*, pp. 221-258; and Jan Karski, *The Story of a Secret State*, pp. 236 and 264-274.

23. See Robert Littell, editor, *The Czech Black Book*; and Royal D.

Hutchinson, *The Radio and the Resistance: A Case Study from Czechoslovakia* (Hellerup, Denmark: Institute for Peace and Conflict Research, 1970).

24. The term "micro-resistance" was introduced by Professor Arne Næss. See Arne Næss, "Non-military Defence and Foreign Policy" in Adam Roberts, Jerome D. Frank, Arne Næss, and Gene Sharp, "Civilian Defence" (London: Peace News, 1964), p. 42, n. 6.

25. For more detailed discussions of civilian-based defense strategy, see Gene Sharp, *Civilian-Based Defense: A Post-Military Weapons System* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1990), pp. 89-111; Gene Sharp, *Making Europe Unconquerable: The Potential of Civilian-based Deterrence and Defense* (Cambridge, Mass.: Ballinger Books, 1986), pp. 88-118, (London: Taylor & Francis, 1985), pp. 113-151; and Adam Roberts, "Civilian Defence Strategy" in Adam Roberts, editor, *The Strategy of Civilian Defence/Civilian Resistance as a National Defense*, pp. 215-251. Other sources are cited in Sharp, *Making Europe Unconquerable* (Ballinger edition), pp. 160-161, n. 1.

26. For further discussion, see Gene Sharp, *The Politics of Nonviolent Action*, pp. 586-620.

27. William Robert Miller, *Nonviolence: A Christian Interpretation* (New York: Association Press, 1964), p. 247.

28. See Jacques Delarue, *The Gestapo* (New York: William Morrow, 1964), pp. 7-10, 34-46, 173-177, 191-192, and 268 inc. n.; Alan Bullock, *Hitler* (New York: Harper and Row and London: Odhans, 1964), pp. 262-274, 376, 443-466, 482-485, and 546-547; Fritz Tobias, *The Reichstag Fire* (New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1964); William L. Shirer, *The Rise and Fall of the Third Reich* (New York: Simon and Schuster and London: Secker and Warburg, 1962), pp. 191-196, 304, 336, 339, 342, 357, 361-363, 377, 383, 387-388, 406, 427, 443-444, 464, 472, 518-520, 546-547, 554 inc. n., 563, 577, 579 n., 582, 593-595, 602, 604, 615, 756, and 941; Gerald Reitlinger, *The Final Solution* (New York: A. S. Barnes, 1961), pp. 10-15, 100, 309, 330-331, 348, and 361; Edward Crankshaw, *Gestapo* (New York: Viking, and London: Putnam, 1956), pp. 101-102, 109-111, 160, 177, and 191-192.

29. *New York Times*, 15 December 1989, p. A17.

30. The term "transpartisan" was introduced by Bruce Jenkins.

31. The tasks of the Swedish Commission on Nonmilitary Resistance, established by the Parliament and Government, were outlined in the Swedish Government ordinance: "SPS 1987:199 Förordning

med instruktion för delegationen för icke-militärt motstånd" 23 April 1987.

32. Georg von Rauch, *The Baltic States: The Years of Independence 1917-1940* (London: C. Hurst Co. and Berkeley: University of California Press, 1974), p. 120.

33. Johan Jørgen Holst, "Civilian-Based Defense in a New Era" (Monograph No. 2, Cambridge, Massachusetts: The Albert Einstein Institution, 1990), pp. 14-15.

34. Parliamentary Information Bureau, Vilnius, Lithuania, translated by the Lithuanian Information Center, Brooklyn, New York. Release No. 145, 28 February 1991.

35. Letter from Olgerts Eglitis, 7 October 1991.

36. Unpublished communication from Steven Huxley, 21 February 1991, prepared on the basis of interviews with Estonian researchers, government policy advisers, Popular Front officials, and Home Defense members.