Publications > Nonviolent Sanctions
vol. 6, no. 4
Spring 1995

Nonviolent Sanctions
vol. 6, no. 4
Spring 1995

Download PDF file Contents Keeping watch in Sri Lanka Burma Update Dialogue on Cuba Frederick Douglass quote Keeping Watch: Peace Brigades International Provides Nonviolent Accompaniment Services in Sri Lanka by Patrick G. Coy In July 1993, I arrived in Sri Lanka to conduct a participant observation study of Peace Brigades International (PBI). PBI is an international nongovernmental human rights organization that provides international observers and nonviolent escorts for threatened human rights organizations and activists in situations of high political violence. In order to study their work from the inside out, I completed PBI’s training program and spent three months with their team of international volunteers in Sri Lanka. My initial ride from the airport to the capital city of Colombo was hot and long. The old PBI jeep overheated and we had to fetch water to cool it. When we finally turned up the street on the final leg of our journey to the PBI house, Helen Stevenson, PBI team member from Australia, pointed ahead to a tree. I knew immediately, before she even spoke, to what she was pointing. Where the pavement turns to dirt, and before the narrow street begins its climb up the hill, the tree leans far out over the street. About a foot and a half in diameter, the tree has grown at a prominent angle. At the ten-foot mark, it makes a sharp turn and runs exactly parallel to the ground. The tree grew like that long enough to add three feet to its trunk. Then it straightened itself and resumed its climb skyward. It is the sort of tree that marks the land it stands upon, that sets its patch of land apart from the others. "When you see that crooked tree up ahead, you know you are home," Helen told me. Indeed it is true, for the crooked tree stands tight against the front stoop of the PBI house. I couldn’t leave or enter the house without walking alongside it and wondering at the way it had grown. As I came home one day in one of the motorized trishaws that dominate the transportation scene in Colombo, the driver told me that the house PBI rents formerly belonged to a prominent Tamil politician. He said the politician was gunned down a few short blocks from the house in 1983, when the current ethnic conflict exploded on this island nation. The conflict’s manifestations are ubiquitous. Directly across the street from the PBI house is a vacant lot. It is a conspicuous piece of real estate since it is the only lot on the street without a house. There used to be a house there, but it fell victim to the fires that burned through the city in 1983. Above everything else, Sri Lanka is a land marked by diversity. Tropical rain forests richer than any others left in Asia, mountains filled with waterfalls, tea plantations, and ancient Buddhist shrines, with coastal beaches here and rice paddies there, all contribute to a varied and beautiful landscape. And the diversity that defines the land extends to the people who inhabit it. The Sinhalese population (74 percent) is primarily Buddhist. The Tamils (18 percent) are mostly Hindus. Rounding out the population are Muslims (7 percent) and Burghers, Christian descendants of the Portuguese and Dutch colonizers. Both Hindus and Buddhists believe in reincarnation. So I took to greeting the crooked tree when I came and went from the PBI house. I wondered what it saw in its various life forms in Sri Lanka and imagined what made it grow the way it had in this life. What forces compelled it to take such a sharp turn and grow parallel to the ground? Was it a reaction to the violence that has left tens of thousands dead and disappeared here? What, I wondered, would I do if my neighbors were burned out by a racist mob, or gunned down, or simply missing, only to later wash ashore on the beaches? No answers ever came from the tree, and my own privileged life provided few hints. My work as an escort and international observer for Peace Brigades International, however, put me in contact with Sri Lankans whose answer to the violence includes humanitarian efforts, human rights documentation and promotion, and nonviolent organizing for social and political change. That work has put them in varying degrees of danger. Some fear violence or harassment from the Sinhalese-dominated government, others are targeted by a variety of paramilitary groups, and still others fear the Liberation Tigers of Tamil (LTTE). What they have in common is that they have solicited Peace Brigades International to help them secure safer political space within which to exercise their human rights. PBI escorts are always foreign nationals. The presence of unarmed international escorts is thought to function as a deterrent since violence directed at foreign nationals often brings much higher political costs than the same actions directed at local citizens. And in the event the deterrence fails, PBI is on site to document the violence, to publicize it, and to bring pressure to bear through its Emergency Response Network. Hundreds of people around the globe are signed on to the network and are committed to making phone calls or sending faxes or letters in an attempt to have the perceived injustice righted. Nonviolence has been an especially important ingredient in the recipe for political change of late. From Manila to Moscow, nonviolent sanctions have helped bring governments down, stayed the hand of oppression and human rights violations, and created space for alternative political actors and parties to flourish. Yet the waging of nonviolent conflict has received little scholarly attention relative to other aspects of the field of peace and conflict studies. Moreover, the role of third parties in nonviolent conflict has received even less attention. Although inherently limited due to the dynamics of nonviolence, outside third parties like Peace Brigades International may play meaningful roles in nonviolent political and human rights struggles. My preliminary research indicates that for at least some individual activists, the availability of international observers and nonviolent escorts is a significant consideration in the political choices they make regarding their activism. Some activists turn to PBI for accompaniment services that they cannot get elsewhere, and without which they might not choose to continue their work for human rights or political change. A PBI client I frequently accompanied had filed a fundamental human rights suit in the Supreme Court of Sri Lanka against the government and a paramilitary group, claiming abduction, torture, and false imprisonment. After filing the lawsuit, he received death threats and other harassments designed to get him to withdraw the suit. "I wrote to all the international human rights organizations and local ones, too," he told me. "Very few even answered me. I was so desperate. Those who did answer me said they could not provide protection . . . I had to carry on the case, and at the same time, I had to have some security to do so." This particular client was convinced "my case would not have been successful without PBI." I also met and interviewed other threatened activists who made different choices. For example, one threatened Buddhist monk who came to PBI for assistance eventually turned down the team’s offer of accompaniment. Following his release from prison, he had sought security by going partially underground; he decided that the presence of international observers would only heighten his visibility and decrease his safety. These two brief examples suggest that the usefulness of international observers and nonviolent protective accompaniment is conditioned by a number of social and political factors. Those factors need to be identified and explored by those making use of the services, by those offering them, and by present and future researchers. The post-Cold War era is marked by a host of regional and ethnic conflicts mixed with a steady stream of contentious human rights issues. While much of this conflict has been waged violently, some significant applications of nonviolent principles of struggle have also taken place. In response to burgeoning requests for assistance from parties engaged in nonviolent struggle and the exercise of basic human rights, other international nongovernmental organizations besides PBI have recently begun to field teams of unarmed international observers and nonviolent escorts. Questions that go beyond the obvious issue of the effectiveness of nonviolent protective accompaniment techniques must be addressed in PBI’s work and in future initiatives launched by others. These include issues of sovereignty, the role of nongovernmental actors in the international system, universal versus culturally bound conceptions of human rights, and the apparent reliance upon the unequal power relations between the one third world and the two thirds world for protective accompaniment strategies to work. Still, I am thankful for the opportunity to have walked alongside Sri Lankans of different ethnic and religious backgrounds who nevertheless share a commitment to justice and nonviolent struggle, and who are willing to endure tremendous sacrifices for that commitment. Most have absorbed setbacks and oppressions. Indeed, some seem as badly bent from the experience as the tree outside the door of the PBI house. But many also shared the resiliency of the tree and continued their struggle unabated. Being in their company was a humbling and inspiring experience for me, whose citizenship and political liberties come at comparatively little cost. Patrick G. Coy is an Einstein Institution Fellow and a Ph.D. candidate in the Maxwell School's Social Science Program at Syracuse University. Burma Update by Harn Yawnghwe, Burma Donors Secretariat In December, at the request of several Burma donors, the Burma Donor’s Secretariat, in cooperation with the Albert Einstein Institution, hosted a Political Defiance Seminar in Cambridge. The objective was to familiarize donors with the concept of political defiance (PD) to enable them to better evaluate projects on political defiance and democracy training for Burma. Dr. Gene Sharp, senior scholar-in-residence at the Einstein Institution, explained the theoretical background of the concept based on years of research into nonviolent struggles for liberation and defense in various parts of the world. In many cases, nonviolent resistance has been used less effectively than it could have been because of the lack of a strategy. In an atomized, alienated, and fearful society such as in Burma today, there is a need to build up the confidence of the people, re-establish the institutions of a civil society, and reverse the atomization process. The people need to be empowered to regain a sense of responsibility for their own lives. It was recommended that, if the Burmese democracy movement intends to bring down the State Law and Order Restoration Council (SLORC) in Burma, it should develop and adopt a nonviolent political defiance strategy instead of improvising as events unfold. The Albert Einstein Institution has been involved in researching a strategic nonviolent option for the Burmese movement since 1991. Colonel Bob Helvey, former U.S. defense attaché to Rangoon, described how the PD option applied to the Burmese situation. All dictatorships achieve a measure of success because of their "pillars of support" such as acquiescence by the population, the bureaucracy, and the military. To apply PD to Burma, SLORC’s pillars of support have to be identified and removed. In most cases, oppressed peoples tend to resist tyranny by violence. Apart from the horrendous consequences, the resistance often fails because it is directed at the dictatorship’s strongest pillar of support—the military. For example, the Burma Army with a strength of 500,000 men outnumbers the ethnic resistance armies by a ratio of at least 10:1 if not 20:1. To challenge SLORC by armed struggle is not a viable option. On the other hand, SLORC’s weakest pillar of support is the people of Burma. The population of 50 million also outnumbers the Burma Army by a ratio of 100:1. If the people can be motivated to move from a position of passive submission to a more active but nonviolent and low-risk noncooperative stance, SLORC can be disempowered. The key is to develop a grand strategy not only to bring the junta down but also to plan ahead for the transition to democracy and to prevent the establishment of another dictatorship. To date the democracy movement has been very successful internationally, and it has been able to hold off SLORC militarily, but it has not been as successful in terms of motivating the population. Efforts have been made, for example, via the Democratic Voice of Burma (DVB) Radio Station in Norway but the lack of an overall strategy and funding have hindered progress. Since 1991, Colonel Helvey has helped the Burmese democracy movement to develop its PD capacity. Training courses funded by the Albert Einstein Institution, the National Endowment for Democracy, and the International Republican Institute, have been held in Manerplaw and elsewhere, and seminars for General Bo Mya of the Karen National Union and the leadership of the National Coalition Government of the Union of Burma have been held in Cambridge. Subsequently, the leadership of the Burmese democracy movement has begun to pay more attention to developing a strategy and a PD capability. The Burma donors at the Cambridge meeting reviewed the needs of the movement in light of the PD strategy and agreed to give priority to projects that will help build up its PD capability. These include: - PD consultants for DVB Radio and the movement as a whole, - PD training for DVB Radio staff to improve their effectiveness, - PD research and strategy development for the democracy movement, - Improved internal communications and information dissemination, and - Democracy and PD training/operations for various units inside Burma. Participants at the seminar included representatives from the American Federation of Labor and Congress of Industrial Organizations, the American Friends of Democracy in Burma, the Burma Donors Secretariat, the Federation of Trade Unions (Burma), the International Centre for Human Rights and Democratic Development (Canada), the Olof Palme International Centre (Sweden), and the Open Society Institute (USA). Dialogue on Cuba: A Reader Writes Dear Friends: I am greatly surprised by the article "Cuban Migration" in the Fall 1994 issue. The valuable part of the article was the last paragraph, outlining a simple nonviolent way to put pressure on the Cuban government in place of the current Draconian sanctions which are causing Cubans to die for lack of medicines and proper food. Were the Cuba situation simply as described in the other 14/15 of the article, this solution would be worth vigorous promotion. I have been to Cuba twice, first in September 1992 as part of a church fact-finding delegation, and again early this year, at which time I spent four extra days investigating current developments on my own. I have also tried to make as careful a personal study of Cuba as possible, as part of my general concern for Latin America and the Caribbean. I am humble about my findings. I know the fallibility of human "knowledge," both second-hand knowledge and that which is gathered in person. Nevertheless, I feel that others should also be humble about their knowledge. In spite of my humility, I have to mention that not only I, but most mainstream religious leaders as well as voting delegates in the UN, have a vastly different impression from that expressed by Holly Ackerman in her article. I am not challenging the events reported in the article, but I am saying that glaring omissions lead to an emphasis which completely distorts the whole picture and makes the bulk of the article, except for the final paragraph, to resemble many current examples of one-sided propaganda. I believe that Ms. Ackerman had no intention of writing a propaganda piece, yet it is so unbalanced that it resembles one. Ms. Ackerman cites two reasons for the recent wave of Cuban migrations to the U.S.: 1) discontent (by which she evidently means political discontent) and 2) Castro’s need for a safety valve. She does not mention economic desperation even as a possibility. Yet my experiences and those of others in Cuba revealed Cubans who are hungry, Cubans experiencing mass malnutrition, Cubans in medical extremity (and some have died). She trusts explicitly the word of balseros without even any apparent suspicion that the word of any of them was influenced by the fact that in order to get asylum in the U.S., they needed to demonstrate that they were political refugees, though she does state that "the material well-being of. . . exiles" in the U.S. caused a demand for exit. She lists many negative examples concerning the Cuban government, but does not mention its dedication to free education through college, making Cuba one of the most educated nations in the hemisphere, approximately equaling the U.S. She does not mention free health care for all, the quality of which rose to about the top in the Third World, until embargo-induced shortages of medicine and medical equipment hamstrung its work. She did not mention the literacy, infant mortality, and life expectancy statistics which give evidence to these high achievements. These achievements may be reasons why many visitors to Cuba have gained the impression that a large proportion, if not most, Cubans do not want to abandon socialism nor revolt against the government, even though Castro’s popularity may well be waning. Ms. Ackerman seems to assume that Castro has a total dictatorship. She does not even feel the necessity to give supporting evidence in view of the fact that in 1992 the National Assembly passed amendments so that now the National Assembly and the Provincial Assemblies are elected by popular vote, and so that Cuba has now a Bill of Rights modeled on the U.S. Bill of Rights. It is indeed possible that Castro may be a dictator; it is even possible (though less likely) that he may be a cruel one (but not in comparison to dictators in many U.S.-supported countries). Indeed, wealthy Cubans and ex-Cubans who no longer have the power to dominate, suppress, and exploit other Cubans do feel abused. Also, there are Cuban political prisoners. (But I think that evaluation of Cuba must depend on comparing them with political prisoners in other countries, including the U.S.) What I am saying is that Ms. Ackerman makes assumptions without giving supporting facts, when the experiences of other observers of Cuba would indicate the need of documentation. Furthermore, Ms. Ackerman follows the U.S. Clinton administration line of attributing the relaxation of bans on migration to chicanery on Castro’s part. Yet she doesn’t mention that before that relaxation, and again at present, what the Cuban government was doing was simply to enforce U.S. policy for the U.S. The U.S. was issuing few visas, while in several ways urging people to "escape" illegally. International customs and U.S. desires coincided in insisting that Cuba should not permit people to migrate to the U.S. without U.S. visas. The Cuban government simply said it would no longer expend its energy and use its sometimes death-dealing police force to maintain these international and U.S.-supported rules. I have no doubt that were the U.S. in the same position Cuba was, the U.S. would have done the same thing. I am writing this for one reason. In the past I have supported the Einstein Institution enthusiastically, since it was founded to educate people about the power of nonviolent defense and nonviolent social change. This is an urgent task in these times when violence and manipulation of people by powers which use violence are our most drastic problems. I think the credibility of an organization may be weakened, and hence its influence weakened, by any tendency it has to be careless in statements it makes. Its influence is likely to suffer when it publishes articles which are unfair or poorly based. In addition, I am concerned that this particular article will increase support for a view of Cuba which has been used as a basis for a terribly cruel and destructive policy of the U.S., one which damages the U.S. and U.S. people as well as Cuban people. Most people reading the article will be more influenced by the bulk of the article than by the last paragraph, which they may even ignore after being overwhelmed with the rest. But I do support the idea of calling for silent human chains in the U.S. and Cuba. I suspect that this suggestion would not be acted on by very many people if any, because most of the support for the "democratize Cuba" movement comes from people and groups who definitely do not want democracy in Cuba but want a return to the pre-revolution dominance of wealthy Cuban and U.S. interests. I would also support the idea of a Latin-American effort to democratize Cuba if it were tied in with an effort to correct the situations in other countries which are much more cruel and repressive, including Guatemala, El Salvador, and other nations. Also priority would need to be given to the places where the cruelties and injustices are most flagrant. I would also want such an effort to include prevention of a return to dictatorship, repression, and reign of terror in Haiti. I very much fear that the U.S. politicians have laid the groundwork for that return. vWe should make tremendous nonviolent efforts. We should be confident in their power. We should also apply them where they are most needed. Unbiased sincerity should be a hallmark of the nonviolent peace and justice (and defense) movement. Yours for a better—and nonviolent—world, H. Raymond Woodruff Retired Minister United Church of Christ Huntington, WV Dialogue on Cuba: Ackerman Responds In response to my article, "Cuban Migration," Rev. Raymond Woodruff presents a dilemma frequently faced by scholars of post-revolutionary Cuba when trying to investigate a discrete portion of Cuban reality. There is an immediate and emotional wail from one or both sides of the Right/Left split that characterizes the political terrain. If the scholar’s interest or analysis fails to conform to one’s preconceptions, the assumption is that it falls in the enemy camp—loyalties run very deep and very hot on Cuba. Unfortunately, there is no short response to Rev. Woodruff’s criticisms, some of which reflect this general problem. Let me begin by explaining the nature of my current research, which served as the basis for the article. I am in the early stages of research analyzing the motivations of the two largest groups of post-1980 Cuban refugees—those who came through Mariel and the balseros (rafters). I ask if at least a portion of these refugees were intentionally engaging in nonviolent action in the form of protest migration. My most fundamental assumption is at variance with the position taken by Rev. Woodruff—and, incidentally with those on the Right who make the same judgment using opposite values. I assume that there is diversity of opinion and motivation among Cubans, both on the island and in Miami. That is, I assume that there will be mixed motivations both within individuals and within the group. I am seeking to be informed about social, economic, and political opinions and motivations directly from the refugees themselves through surveys and extended oral histories. By definition, I am meeting only those Cubans who chose to leave. Rev. Woodruff sees two monoliths—one in Miami, composed of what he terms "wealthy Cubans and ex-Cubans who no longer have the power to dominate, suppress, and exploit other Cubans . . ." The second monolith is in Cuba where, "a large proportion, if not most, Cubans do not want to abandon socialism nor revolt against the government . . ." If Rev. Woodruff would pursue his Cuban studies a bit further, he would learn, for example, that:1 - 5.5% of all Cubans in Dade County, where Miami is located, live below the poverty level. - The average income for Hispanics in Dade County (60% of the total Hispanic population is Cuban) is $27,083. - Of the 54% of Cubans who own their own homes, 66% own units valued below $100,000. - Of the 46% of Cubans who rent, 44% spend more than 35% of their income to pay the rent. - Data on occupational distribution shows that Cubans are represented at every level—skilled, unskilled, professional. Not all wealthy—just folks! And not ex-Cubans by any measure—the vast majority of the 600,000 Cuban-Americans traveling to the island since 1978 were from Miami, and local surveys indicate that almost 30% of Cubans in exile still want to return to their homeland. Many continue to put off obtaining U.S. citizenship for this reason. And not all exploitative either—through remittance and direct travel, Miami-Cubans were a source of $300–$1000 million in hard currency for the Cuban government and a source of sustenance for their families still in Cuba, until the U.S. government prohibited remittances in August 1994.2 Indeed, who does Rev. Woodruff think the small but active, right-wing, fanatical groups in Miami are terrorizing if not other Cubans? I would refer him to three recent reports published by Human Rights Watch on human rights abuses—in Miami and in Cuba.3 We have a political culture at work here and, in both places, it’s working at the elite level against the interests of the diverse mass of Cubans. If we cannot admit the diversity, there can be no dialogue. Dismissing the bulk of Cuban-Americans as right-wing exploiters also shuts down debate, just as new political space is being promoted by historical events. By this I mean that many Cuban-Americans are facing the possibility of asserting themselves in a more active way for the first time, owing to the collapse of Soviet subsidy for the Cuban economy. The plight of their families, friends, and countrypeople is likely to weight their actions in favor of ending the U.S. embargo. Rev. Woodruff makes a third monolith out of the present crisis of the Cuban state, blaming it on the U.S. embargo. He fails to even mention the dissolution of the Soviet Union which subsidized the Cuban economy to the tune of $65 billion between 1960 and 1990, excluding military costs and supplies which add up to $16 billion more. The Russians spent $6 billion in 1989 alone.4 The Cuban Gross Social Product (the standard measure of productivity in Cuba) fell 37–50%, depending on whose estimate you prefer, between 1989 and 1993 and experts running the Cuban economy predict that stagnation is the most that can be hoped for in the foreseeable future.5 It is this massive external shock that is chiefly responsible for current conditions through the roots of dissent go back much further than 1989. This brings up the final monolith of Rev. Woodruff’s letter—the health, education, and welfare achievements of the revolution. The argument here is that the Revolution was essentially too good, spending scarce resources while under a harsh economic blockade, to assure universal, free, high-quality services. He ignores the fact that education, jobs, and job promotion are controlled exclusively by the state and allotted using political correctness as a primary criteria. Having a religious parent or a family history of "non-integration" can prevent a talented student from advancing or from entering a preferred vocation. It is also a pay-as-you-go, work/study system that requires a half-day of farm labor for a half-day of education in the schools in the country or 45 days in labor camps for those in the city. Mandatory state service or military service is required of all. The political selection criteria leave many people out of higher education or track them into low-paying or undesirable work. Since the early 1980s there has also been high youth unemployment that has caused further alienation with no private alternative. Young people are then pressured to participate in seasonal, agricultural work brigades which seem increasingly like forced labor. Histories of decades of thwarted education and work are two of the most frequently raised and painful memories for recently arrived balseros. Another salient point regarding the Cuban welfare state is that its position within Latin America remains unchanged between pre- and post-1959. It was then, as it is now, among the top three in indicators of well-being. What changed under the revolution was the uniformity of access and benefits. While this clearly has served persons who were poor prior to 1959, it is also clear that a leveling process has taken place within the society and that development has been at a standstill at least since 1985.6 Whether it was worth the cost and what alternatives exist at this point, can and should be evaluated. Finally, Rev. Woodruff cannot understand why I did not mention the expansion of democratic mechanisms in Cuba, namely the process of direct election for the provincial and national levels of the National Assembly of Popular Power (NAPP). Bear in mind, that only the Cuban Communist Party is allowed to participate (though people with religious beliefs can now apply for membership), that mass organizations nominate candidates which must then be approved by special election commissions, that no media campaigning is allowed, that voters are asked to mark for or against two lists of candidates (one containing 589 for national office and the other 1,190 names for the 14 provincial offices) and that 2.7 million Cubans chose to submit blank or spoiled ballots in the fist rounds of balloting in December 1992. More significant than these marginal changes in the NAPP—which is, after all voluntary and largely administrative in function and meets only twice per year for two days—were the emergency powers granted to the Central Committee of the Cuban Communist Party by the same Fourth Party Congress that requested the electoral changes. These emergency powers include the right to overrule and usurp the established organs of the state, economy, and party—including but not limited to the NAPP. Far from being a democratic opening, these minor changes, viewed alongside of the massive powers of exception, were a cause of concern even to staunch supporters of the revolution.7 It is this type of structural arrangement that makes Castro’s personal and political project clear—it is not socialism that is being salvaged but the power of the historic leadership. In this context, the manipulation of migration is not "chicanery" but astute political calculation. Rev. Woodruff is equally misinformed about the mechanism by which most balseros are processed into the U.S., stating that they must prove a case for political asylum and may be censoring their comments out of fear for their immigration status. In fact, very few Cubans choose to request political asylum because the Cuban Adjustment Act of November 2, 1966 (80 Statutes-at-Large 1161) and the Refugee Act of March 17, 1980 (94 Statutes-at-Large 102) give those Cubans arriving before August 19, 1994 a quicker and surer route to obtain permanent resident alien status one year and one day after entering the country. They enter under humanitarian parole for a year and then adjust their status to legal resident—purely a matter of routine in Miami. While many people suffer from the shock of a new culture and language and are less than conversant with the laws, the program operated through the Community Relations Service of the Justice Department, to facilitate Cuban adjustment, is a model for helping newcomers (including financial support, and a variety of services, training, referral, information, and special projects). It bears no resemblance to the stereotype of hiding from the "Migra" that many of us associate with immigration. Indeed, some experts have speculated that the small margin of assistance and welcome offered by this program, is what has permitted the foundation of a reasonably prosperous Cuban enclave rather than a disenfranchised sub-culture.8 It seems advisable to extend this model to others, rather than to begrudge it to the Cubans. In the extensive interviews and written surveys I’ve conducted to date with post-1989 balseros (about 100 people in all), four common themes are raised repeatedly to describe the current reality on the island. These, too, contrast with Rev. Woodruff’s four themes of contented socialists; revolutionary achievements in human welfare; a population menaced by the U.S. embargo; and a progressively democraticizing regime. The themes include: - The necessity of and psychological strain occasioned by llevando una doble cara ("wearing a double face") in Cuba. Essentially, refugees report that one must conform to get by and that conformity in Cuba means political endorsement and cheerful participation. People are then typically left with fears of discovery when they dissimulate, psychological numbness from feigning enthusiasm they don’t feel, or enormous resentment for lost opportunities. - The constant awareness that one does not know quién es quién (who is who) in Cuba. Every neighborhood Committee for Defense of the Revolution (CDR) and work unit contains persons employed in covert domestic intelligence work and it is a monitored population. The uncertainty this produces adds an element of mistrust and apathy. - Todo Cuba es un robo (All of Cuba is a case of robbery) or the need to steal and generally engage in illegal black market activity to survive. This necessity has increased enormously since 1989. Though the basic monthly food ration prior to 1989 was estimated by experts to suffice for only two weeks—leaving most people to forage in the black market for half the month and creating a second economy amounting to two billion pesos per year—it now lasts only 1-3 days, causing massive pilfering of state sources of supply, destroying norms of work and morality, and leaving most people vulnerable to arrest. The black market is estimated at 7-10 times pre-1989 levels.9 - combined effect of 1-3 above make the conditions of life, moral loathing, fear of violence, and retribution at a neighborhood and work-site level intolerable, with many asserting that civil war may result. How these factors play out for each individual is, of course, a different story. Few of those I’ve talked to were malnourished as Rev. Woodruff suggests. On the contrary, many had access to food or salable items (fishermen, restaurant workers, engineers with access to parts, clerks in a warehouse, etc.) But these positions also increase risk, surveillance, and internal conflict. It is an unfinished tale with intricate motivations on the part of all the players. By documenting the process of some of those involved at a mass level, I’m hoping to illuminate how average people come to grips with complicated social issues—particularly those who choose nonviolent action. Notes 1. All statistics taken from: Research Division Metropolitan Dade County Planning Department, "Hispanics in Dade County 1990," Miami: Office of County Manager, 1994. 2. Different economists make estimates within this range for exile remittances, visits and charges. For details see: Carmelo Mesa-Lago. Are Economic Reforms Propelling Cuba to the Market? Coral Gables: The North-South Center of the University of Miami, 1994. 3. See: Human Rights Watch. Repression and the Cuban Exodus of August 1994; Stifling Dissent in the Midst of Crisis; and Dangerous Dialogue Revisited. New York, 1994. 4. Mesa-Lago. Ibid. 5. Lage, Carlos. Granma International, November 10, 1993, 9. 6. For a complete discussion of the phases and accomplishments of development see: Carmelo Mesa Lago, The Economy of Socialist Cuba: A Two Decade Appraisal, Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 1981. 7. See, for example, the statement of one of the founders of the Antonio Maceo Brigade (A group of Cuban-Americans supportive of the revolutionary project in Cuba): Marifeli Pérez-Stable, "Vanguard Party Politics in Cuba," in Conflict and Change in Cuba, eds. Enrique A. Baloyra and James A. Morris, Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 1993, 67-86. 8. See: Alejandro Portes and Alex Stepick, City on the Edge: The Transformation of Miami, Berkeley: The University of California Press, 1993. 9. For extensive surveys about sufficiency of food rations see: Juan Clark, Mito y Realidad. Caracas: Saeta Ediciones, 1992. For information on the size and changes in the black market see: Mesa-Lago, Propelling Cuba to the Market. Frederick Douglass Quote Let me give you a word on the philosophy of reform. The whole history of the progress of human liberty shows that all concessions yet made to her august claims have been born of earnest struggle. The conflict has been exciting, agitating, all absorbing, and for the time being putting all other tumults to silence. It must do this or it does nothing. If there is no struggle, there is no progress. Those who profess to favor freedom, and yet depreciate agitation, are men who want crops without plowing up the ground. They want rain without thunder and lightning. They want the ocean without the awful roar of its many waters. This struggle may be a moral one; or it may be a physical one; or it may be both moral and physical; but it must be a struggle. Power concedes nothing without a demand. It never did and it never will. Find out just what people will submit to, and you have found the exact amount of injustice and wrong which will be imposed upon them; and these will continue until they are resisted with either words or blows, or with both. The limits of tyrants are prescribed by the endurance of those whom they oppress. — Frederick Douglass, Letter to an abolitionist associate, 1849 Download PDF file