MAKING THE
ABOLITION OF WAR
A REALISTIC GOAL

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The destructiveness of modern war is widely understood. Yet most governments, backed by their populations, amass the largest array of military weaponry and forces of which they are capable. Clearly, none of the past proposals and movements to abolish war and to bring in an era of world peace has succeeded. Indeed, in significant respects the achievement of those goals now seems less likely than it did in earlier decades.

This is, of course, not the only grave political problem we have failed to solve. Others include dictatorship, genocide, systems of social oppression, and popular powerlessness. They must be considered as we seek a solution to the problem of war.

Most people respond to the continuation of wars and war preparations with a sense of resignation, hopelessness, or powerlessness. "War is inevitable," it is thought; we blame "human nature" or our favorite "evil forces." Other persons faithfully persist in plodding the old paths to the now tarnished dreams—without reexamining whether they are heading in the right direction. Still others try to run faster to their goal, or seek shortcuts, or carry out acts of desperation—without a basis for confidence that their efforts can succeed either, or even certainty that they will not make matters worse.

All this is not good enough. More creative responses are possible. Indeed, it is our responsibility to seek to develop them. If soundly based and realistically developed and applied, they might offer new hope.

If new responses to the problem of war are to be soundly based they must take into consideration some hard facts which most peace workers rarely face. These include the following:

- Conflicts of some type will always exist within societies and between societies, requiring use of some type of power;
- "Human nature" need not, and most likely will not, be changed;
- People and governments will not sacrifice freedom or justice for the sake of peace;
- Mass conversions to pacifism are not going to occur;
- There is no break in the spiral of military technology within the context of military technology and military assumptions;
- Brutal dictatorships and oppressive systems exist, will continue, may become more serious, and may seek to expand;
- The abolition of capitalism does not produce the abolition of war;
- Negotiations are no substitute for the capacity to struggle and apply sanctions;
- Unilateral "disarmament"—abandonment of defense capacity—is no alternative to the war system and is not possible;
Major multilateral disarmament is nearly as unlikely;
National independence is not the origin of war;
World government is either unrealizable, or if achieved would itself be likely
to produce a world civil war, become tyrannical, and be used to impose or
perpetuate injustice.
Our search for a solution to the problem of war must not be based on utopian
illusions, or naiveté concerning the political intentions of protagonists in inter-
national conflicts.

Without understanding the nature of a problem well, it is exceptionally difficult to find or develop a
solution to it. It is possible that we have not under-
stood the problem of war adequately. It is necessary
to look beyond the proposals and doctrines of the
past if we are to deal with this problem. It is often
difficult to begin to explore fresh approaches, for we
may be emotionally attached to a favorite remedy,
and we are sometimes intellectually unprepared for thinking about the problem
in unfamiliar ways.

War, and military preparations to threaten or to wage it, are obviously com-
plex in their causes and consequences. They have also changed significantly in
recorded history. Despite this complexity and variability it is possible to look
again at these phenomena and gain new insights into their nature and the reasons
for their perpetuation.

War and military capacity have served various functions, including to attack
and oppress the people of another society, or even of one's own society. Those ig-
noble uses of war and military means should not, however, lead us to ignore the
more noble purposes for which they have been used (or in some cases claimed to
be used thereby gaining popular support which would have been uncertain for
the real objectives).

Important issues of lasting importance are often at stake in major internal and
international conflicts. The world is politically a dangerous place. Dictatorships
arise, perpetuate themselves, and often expand. Countries are attacked. Oppres-
sion exists in a variety of forms. Minority cliques, military and political, over-
throw legitimated governments, and establish new oppression. Genocide is per-
petrated. Whole peoples are exploited and dominated by domestic and foreign
masters.

Effective means of struggle are therefore needed to meet a variety of conflict
situations. Counterviolence has been used in such conflicts to control, restrain,
limit, or defeat opponents using violence to serve their own ends. Thus, violent
struggle including war has very often been used to advance or defend humanitar-
ian goals and societies against hostile forces.

Violent conflict has served as a technique of struggle, as the ultimate sanction,
to be applied in times of severe danger to advance or defend the way of life, beliefs, independence, or chosen social system against oppressors and attackers. Whatever the disadvantages of such violence, people in many societies and historical periods have believed it to be the only alternative to impotence and passive submission in face of threats to that which they have cherished.

In the case of foreign invasions, the answer was defensive war. War has thus relieved people of a sense of impotence in times of danger, and has given them a powerful technique to pursue the conflict in defense and furtherance of their principles, objectives, and society. The mass of humanity has believed—and still believes—that no other technique could be adequate in such crises.

War may have been brutal and immoral, but—whatever its demerits and results—it provided an ultimate sanction and means of struggle which could be held in reserve to support one’s arguments in international negotiations and to deter attack, and which could be used in open struggle when people believed that foreign military action threatened their principles and liberty. The justifications of war and military preparations offered by both governments and ordinary men and women boil down to that.

Even in an age of missiles and hydrogen bombs, which—people know—could lead to widespread extermination rather than genuine defense, people still cling to war. They do this because they see the present weapons as simply an extension of the earlier forms of war. If they know that such weapons cannot be used in a rational conflict, they believe that their existence will prevent the conflict from turning into war, and thus prevent their way of life being taken from them. The weapons thereby help to keep people from feeling entirely helpless in the face of international dangers.

As long as there is a felt need for such a means of struggle, and as long as people see no adequate substitute to take the place of war, there is no chance of war being renounced or abandoned. People and whole societies will not choose to be defenseless.

Since war is threatened against and used to attack other countries which need to be strong enough to deter attack and to defend themselves, no break in the cycle of war is possible as long as people and governments do not perceive the existence and effectiveness of alternative nonmilitary means of defense.

Peace proposals and movements of the past have failed to offer a credible alternative defense policy in place of war. Therefore, whether they instead offered as solutions to the problem of war negotiations, compromises, conciliation, international conferences, supranational leagues, or anti-war resistance, their common failure could have been predicted.

On the other hand, the stubborn persistence of advocates of strong defense in considering only military means and failing to investigate nonmilitary possibili-
ties has led to the present dangerous situation and to the lack of development of possible options.

If we want to reduce drastically, or remove, reliance on war and other types of violent conflict it is necessary to substitute a nonviolent counterpart of war, "war without violence," by which people can defend liberty, their way of life, humanitarian principles, their institutions and society, at least as effectively against military attack as can military means.

Such a substitute defense policy would need to be one which can be (1) held in reserve to encourage settlements without resort to open struggle (as by facilitating settlements, reducing misperceptions, and deterring aggression by effective defense capacity as such, and (2) used effectively in an open defense struggle against attack. ("Defense" here must be understood literally, as protection, warding off of danger, preservation, and the like. Defense is therefore not necessarily tied to military means, and has been provided by nonmilitary forms of struggle.)

In 1939 Albert Einstein signed a now famous letter to President Roosevelt expressing the view that it was possible that new weapons of a completely different type could be based on nuclear fission. Although atomic nuclei themselves could not be seen by ordinary human beings, and although no such atomic weapons, even primitive prototypes of them, had ever existed, the Manhattan Project was launched. With sufficient scientists and resources a whole new weapons system was created.

More evidence exists today that we could develop a new type of defense system not requiring military means than existed in 1939 that nuclear bombs were possible. In this case we have primitive prototypes of the new policy, in cases of improvised predominantly nonviolent revolutions against tyrants and defense struggles against coups d'état and foreign occupations.

We also have an insight into the nature of political power, which may be in politics as significant as has been in military weaponry the theory of the workings of the atom. The power of all rulers and governments is vulnerable, impermanent, and dependent on sources in the society. Those sources can be identified: acceptance of the ruler's right to rule ("authority"), economic resources, manpower, military capacity, knowledge, skills, administration, police, prisons, courts, and the like. Each of these sources is in turn closely related to, or directly dependent upon, the degree of cooperation, submission, obedience, and assistance that the ruler is able to obtain from his subjects. These include both the general population and his paid "helpers" and agents. That dependence makes it possible, under certain circumstances, for the subjects to restrict or sever these sources of power, by reducing or withdrawing their necessary cooperation and
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obedience.

If the withdrawal of acceptance, submission, and help can be maintained in face of the ruler's punishments, then the end of the regime is in sight. Thus, all rulers are dependent for their positions and political power upon the obedience, submission, and cooperation of their subjects. This not only applies internally, but also, with variations, in cases of attempted foreign invasion and occupation. The theory that power derives from violence, and that victory goes to the side with the greater capacity for violence, is false.

Instead, the will to defy and resist becomes extremely important. Hitler admitted that the problem of "ruling the people in the conquered regions" was "psychological":

One cannot rule by force alone. True, force is decisive, but it is equally important to have this psychological something which the animal trainer also needs to be master of his beast. They must be convinced that we are the victors.

The civilian population can refuse to be convinced.

A vast history exists of people who, refusing to be convinced that the apparent "powers that be" were omnipotent, defied and resisted powerful rulers, foreign conquerors, domestic tyrants, oppressive systems, internal usurpers, and economic masters. Contrary to usual perceptions, these means of struggle by protest, noncooperation, and disruptive intervention have played major historical roles in all parts of the world, even in cases in which attention is usually concentrated on parallel or later political violence.

These unrefined forms of nonviolent struggle have been used as major or the predominant means of defense against foreign invaders or internal usurpers, or both—mostly improvised, without preparations, training, or planning—in various instances and countries. These include: German strikes and political noncooperation to the 1920 Kapp Putsch against the Weimar Republic; German government-sponsored noncooperation in the Ruhr in 1923 to the French and Belgian occupation; major aspects of the Dutch anti-Nazi resistance, including several large strikes, 1940-1945; major aspects of the Danish resistance to the German occupation, including the 1944 Copenhagen general strike, 1940-1945; major parts of the Norwegian resistance to the Quiling regime and the occupation, 1940-1945; and the Czechoslovak resistance to the Soviet invasion and occupation, 1968-1969.

The nature and accomplishments of the Czechoslovak defense are already forgotten by many and are being distorted when reference is made to it. The resistance ultimately failed, but it held off full Soviet control for eight months—from August to April—something which would have been utterly impossible by military means. It also, it is reported, caused such morale problems among Rus-
sian troops that the first units had to be rotated out of the country in a few days, and shipped, not to European U.S.S.R. where they could report what was happening, but to Siberia. All this was done without preparations and training, much less contingency planning. This suggests even in final defeat (as a result of capitulation by Czechoslovak officials, not defeated resistance) a power potential even greater than military means.

In addition to such cases as these, other resistance movements and revolutions against internal oppression and dictatorships are relevant. These include major aspects of these cases: the 1980-1981 Polish workers' movement for an independent trade union and democratization; the 1944 revolutions in El Salvador and Guatemala against established military dictatorships; the 1978-1979 revolution against the Shah in Iran; the 1905-1906 and February 1917 revolutions in Imperial Russia; the 1953 East German Rising; the Polish movements of 1956, 1970-1971, and 1976; the 1956-57 Hungarian Revolution; the 1963 Buddhist campaign against the Ngo Dinh Diem regime in South Vietnam; the 1953 strike movement at Vorkuta and other prison camps in the Soviet Union; and diverse other cases.

This type of resistance and defense is possible against dictatorships because even extreme forms of them are unable to free themselves from dependence upon the population and society they would rule. Dictatorships, contrary to the usual assumption, are not as strong and omnipotent as they would have us believe, but contain inherent weaknesses of various types which contribute to their inefficiency and reduce the thoroughness of their controls, and limit their longevity. Those weaknesses can be located and resistance can be concentrated at those cracks in the monolith. Nonviolent resistance is much more suited to that task than is violence.

The experiences of the above and other cases of improvised resistance against internal usurpers, foreign invaders, and domestic dictatorships do not offer a ready-made substitute defense policy which can be simply applied as a substitute for war. However, that experience does provide primitive prototypes which could by research and analysis, and by careful evaluation, refinement, preparations, planning, and training become the basis of a new defense policy—one based not on military weapons and forces, but on the civilian population and the society's institutions, on societal strength. An alternative to military defense is possible.

This alternative policy of deterrence and defense is called "civilian-based defense." That is a defense policy which utilizes prepared civilian struggle—nonviolent action—to preserve the society's freedom, sovereignty, and constitutional system against internal usurpations and external invasions and occupations. The aim is to deter to defeat such attacks. This is to be done not simply by
efforts to alter the will of the attacker, but by the capacity to make effective dom-
ination and control impossible by both massive and selective nonviolent nonco-
operation and defiance by the population and its institutions. The aim is to make
the populace unrulable by the attackers and to deny them their objectives. A gen-
ue capacity to do that, if accurately perceived, could deter both internal take-
overs and foreign invasions.

It is possible to exert extreme pressure and even to coerce by nonviolent
means. Rather than converting the opponent, civilian struggle has more often
been waged by disrupting, paralyzing, or coercing the opponent by denying the
cooperation he needed, and upsetting the normal operation of the system. This is
a foundation for civilian-based strategies.

An attack for ideological and indoctrination purposes, for example, would
likely involve noncooperation and defiance by schools, newspapers, radio,
television, churches, all levels of government, and the general population, to re-
ject the indoctrination attempts, and reassertion of democratic principles.

An attack aimed at economic exploitation would be met with economic
resistance — boycotts, strikes, noncooperation by experts, management,
transport workers and officials—aimed at reducing, dissolving or reversing any
economic gains to the attackers.

Coups d'état and executive usurpations would be met with noncooperation of
civil servants, bureaucrats, government agencies, state and local government,
police departments, and virtually all the social institutions and general popula-
tion as a whole, to deny legitimacy, and to prevent consolidation of effective con-
trol by the usurpers over the government and society.

Various population groups and institutions would have responsibility for particular defense tasks, depending on the exact issues at stake.

For example, police would refuse to locate and ar-
rest patriotic resisters against the attacker. Jour-
nalists and editors refusing to submit to censorship
would publish newspapers illegally in large editions
or many small editions—as happened in the Russian
1905 Revolution and in several Nazi-occupied countries. Free radio programs
would continue from hidden transmitters — as happened in Czechoslovakia in
1968.

Clergymen would preach the duty to refuse help to the invader—as happened
in the Netherlands under the Nazis.

Politicians, civil servants, judges, and the like by ignoring or defying the
enemy's illegal orders, would keep the normal machinery of government, the
courts, etc., out of his control — as happened in the German resistance to the
Kapp Putsch in 1920.

The judges would declare the invader's officials an illegal and unconstitutional
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body, continue to operate on the basis of pre-invasion laws and constitutions, and refuse to give moral support to the invader, even if they had to close the courts.

Teachers would refuse to introduce propaganda into the schools — as happened in Norway under the Nazis. Attempts to control schools could be met with refusal to change the school curriculum or to introduce the invader’s propaganda, explanations to the pupils of the issues at stake, continuation of regular education as long as possible, and, if necessary, closing the schools and holding private classes in the children’s homes.

Workers and managers would impede exploitation of the country by selective strikes, delays, and obstructionism — as happened in the Ruhr in 1923.

Attempts to control professional groups and trade unions could be met by persistence in abiding by their pre-invasion constitutions and procedures, refusal to recognize new organizations set up by the invader, refusal to pay dues or attend meetings of any new pro-invader organizations, and the wielding of disruptive strikes, managerial defiance and obstruction, and economic and political boycotts.

These defense tasks are only illustrative of a multitude of specific forms of defense action which would be possible. Civilian-based defense operates not only on the principle that the price of liberty is eternal vigilance, but that defense of independence and freedom is the responsibility of every citizen.

This is a more total type of defense than the military system, since it involves the whole population and all its institutions in defense struggle. Because such participation must be voluntary in order to be reliable in crises, and because of reliance on nonviolent means, however, civilian-based defense is intrinsically democratic.

As in military warfare, this type of struggle is applied in face of violent enemy action. Casualties are — as in military struggle — to be expected. In this case, however, they are utilized to advance the cause of the defenders (as by increasing their resistance) and to undermine the opponent’s power (as by alienating his own supporters). There is no more reason to be dismayed by casualties, or to capitulate when they occur, than there is when they occur in military conflict. In fact, it appears that casualties in civilian struggles are far lower than in military conflicts.

Civilian-based defense also has an attack capacity against usurpers and invaders — which one United States Army general has called “the sword of CBD.” The basic dynamics of nonviolent struggle — particularly the process of “political jiu-jitsu” — and deliberate efforts would be aimed to undermine the will, loyalty, and obedience of the attacker’s troops, functionaries, and administrators. The result could

OTHER THEATERS OF OPERATION
be to make them unreliable, inefficient, less brutal in repression, and at times mutinous on a large scale. This could, in extreme cases, dissolve the machinery of repression and administration.

Similar undermining efforts would be aimed at the enemy’s usual supporters and home population, with the objective of producing dissent, disruption, and opposition in his own camp. This would, if achieved, be highly important, but prime reliance should not be shifted from the home front.

Under some conditions, significant international opposition to the attack and support for the civilian defenders may be aroused. Occasionally this would involve international economic and political sanctions against the invader or internal usurper. These sanctions may be significant at times—witness the Arab oil embargo—although the defenders must primarily rely on their own actions.

Of the three broad theaters of defense—denial of the enemy’s objectives, provocation of morale problems and unrest in the opponent’s camp, and arousal of international support for the defenders and sanctions against the attacker—the direct blockage by the civilian defenders of the attacker’s objectives is by far the most important.

**NUCLEAR WEAPONS**

Major attention is required in consideration of this policy to its possible relevance or limitations in relation to nuclear weapons. This field has not yet been adequately examined. It is possible, on the one hand, that civilian-based defense may be developed to be an adequate substitute for conventional military defense, but be irrelevant to the nuclear question. In that case, nuclear weapons would need to be dealt with by other means, such as arms control treaties, other international controls, unilateral initiatives to reduce reliance on nuclear weapons, or even unilateral dismantling of them as sources of greater danger than safety.

On the other hand, civilian-based defense may be relevant to the problem of nuclear weapons in several indirect ways. For example, a country with a civilian-based defense policy and without nuclear weapons is far less likely to be targeted by nuclear powers than are countries with nuclear armed rockets aimed at other nuclear powers.

In a different context, the massive buildup of so-called “tactical” nuclear weapons in Western Europe to be used in case of a Soviet Blitzkrieg westward is premised on the incapacity of N.A.T.O. forces to defend Western Europe successfully by conventional military means. Thoroughly prepared civilian-based defense policies in Western European countries by their capacity to ensure a massive and continuing defense struggle capable of maintaining the autonomy of the attacked societies, denying the Soviets their objectives, and undermining the morale and reliability of the Soviet troops—evidence for that exists—would constitute a more powerful deterrent and defense policy than can conventional
Since civilian-based defense once fully developed and prepared to be a powerful defense policy would only be adopted if it is judged to be effective, it would be possible for only one or a few countries initially to adopt the policy, even without treaties with other countries pledged to do so, and while most countries remain militarily armed. Later, when convinced of the effectiveness and advantages of the policy, other countries might also transarm.

The first countries to adopt civilian-based defense are likely to be those which most want self-reliance in defense but which lack the ability to achieve this by military means. Governmental studies and public discussion on this policy have proceeded further in Sweden and the Netherlands than elsewhere, but the policy potentially suits the strategic needs of Austria and Finland more obviously. At this point, smaller Western European countries seem the most likely to be the first both to add a civilian-based defense component to their overall defense posture, and also, at a significantly later date, to transarm fully to the new policy.

It is extremely difficult to make accurate predictions, but it is quite possible that one or even several Western European countries might add a civilian-based defense component to their predominantly military policies—with or without alliances—by 1990 and that the first full case of transarmament to the new policy could occur by 2005.

There would inevitably be strongholds of resistance to adoption of the policy, and large military powers are unlikely, and probably unable, to transarm in a short span of time. Even they, however, might add a civilian-based defense component, if its effectiveness and utility for given purposes could be convincingly demonstrated.

Any country which begins to move toward adoption of this policy must, almost inevitably, begin by making such an addition of a civilian-based defense component alongside the predominantly military policy. As preparations and training proceeded, and as justifiable confidence in the ability of the new policy to deter attack and defend successfully against it grew, it would become possible to expand this component. The military component might then be seen as progressively less needed, and even as harmful to the full effectiveness of civilian-based defense. The military component could then be gradually reduced and phased out.
Dictatorial regimes and unstable governments would probably cling hardest to military capacity for both domestic and international purposes. Dictatorships could, of course, still be influenced, both by removal of fear of foreign military attack (contributing to internal relaxation), and by nonviolent pressures for liberalization and democratization from their own populations.

Assuming that civilian-based defense is developed into a viable policy, it would have several highly important consequences. In some cases it would reduce international tensions by separating the defense capacity from the attack capacity of a country, which in military means are largely the same. The policy would restore to small and medium-sized countries self-reliance in defense.

Although not without costs and needs for resources and personnel, civilian-based defense would be significantly less voracious in its consumption of the society's raw materials, industrial capacity, financial resources, and energy supplies than is military defense.

Civilian-based defense would free the foreign policy of a country, and its policies toward United Nations activities, from the controls based on the needs of its military policies. On the other hand, civilian-based defense would be conducive to development of foreign and international policies to assist the resolution of outstanding world problems, meet human needs more adequately, and promote understanding and friendship for the country which had adopted this nonmilitary policy.

The consideration of the possible merits of civilian-based defense, and the planning, preparations, and training for it, are likely to stimulate a reevaluation of the principles and institutions of the society deemed worthy of defense, social improvements to make the society and polity more just and free, and increased popular participation in the operation of the society in peacetime as well as during defense struggles.

In some cases, despite the development of civilian-based defense into a viable policy for deterring and defending against internal usurpations and foreign invasions and occupations, powerful elites and governments may persist in maintaining instead strong military capacities and rejecting civilian-based defense. In that case, those elites and regimes will not—as has long been the practice—be able to "justify" the military preparations on the plea of national defense, when the real purpose is less noble. People will then become able to perceive that the motive for holding to the military capacity is not what they have been told, and to make their judgements and determine their actions accordingly.
Civilian-based defense could break the technological weaponry spiral, and bypass the major problems of negotiated disarmament and arms control agreements. With full recognition of international and domestic dangers, whole countries could mobilize effective capacities to prevent, deter, and defend against attacks — while at the same time reducing, and finally abandoning, reliance on military means.

For the first time, therefore, it becomes possible in advance of crises to choose between reliance on military capacity to deter and defend against attack and reliance on an alternative to war for the same purposes. Without such a choice between two or more policies to deter attacks and defend against them, overwhelmingly, with only the possibility of rare exceptions, most people and governments will cling to war. They do not really have a choice.

With the development of a choice, the future course of events hinges to a significant degree on the extent to which the civilian-based defense option is in fact adequate to the defense tasks and also on the perception of its adequacy. Therefore, the advance basic research, problem-solving research, policy studies, feasibility studies, preparations, contingency planning, and training are of extreme importance. So also are the population’s defense will, the resilience of the society’s non-State institutions in resistance, and the skill of the civilian defenders in formulating and implementing wise strategies. Advance identification of possible objectives of potential internal usurpers and foreign attackers and of vulnerable points in such groups and regimes will also be important.

In all probability, the initial instances of full transarmament to civilian-based defense would not be followed quickly by a rush of many other countries also to transarm, especially in cases in which they felt relatively safe with their military policies and alliances. When civilian-based defense has been put to the test in crises, and has in a few cases demonstrably deterred a possible internal usurpation or foreign invasion, and successfully defended the society against those attacks, the consequences are likely to be profound.

Such evidence of the effectiveness of civilian-based defense could lead to increasing numbers of societies beginning the process of transarmament. Although some countries might never abandon military means entirely, demonstrations that aggression does not pay and can be defeated could limit the harm they could do. Other countries, however, could increasingly move, by adoption of a substitute for military defense, to abandon war as an instrument of national policy. This could lead progressively toward the removal of military power and war as a major factor in international relations.
FOR FURTHER READING:

RELEVANT ADDRESSES:
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